



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Albania: Cabinet Ministers' Profiles Published

AU1507080996 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE
in Albanian 24 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by Arlinda Causholli: "Curriculum Vitae of the Meksi Government Mark Two"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Aleksander Meks

Prime minister; originates from Labove near Gjirokaster; 55 years old; married with two children; graduated as a construction engineer in 1960; later worked for two years as an engineer at Shkopet; appointed to the Institute of Cultural Monuments and the Archaeological Research Center, where he worked as a restorer and researcher until 1990; cofounder of the Democratic Party (PD) in December 1990, member of the Initiating Commission and presidium member at three PD assemblies; author of many articles and monographs; coauthor of university texts; speaks Italian, Russian, French, and English.

Tritan Shehu

Deputy prime minister and foreign minister; originates from Gjirokaster; 47 years old; married, with two children; graduated in medicine with excellent results in 1975 and started work at the Reanimation Unit; in 1982 appointed head of the National University Reanimation Service; later lecturer at the Medical Faculty; doctor of sciences; acquired title of professor after specialization in France; famous as one of the finest reanimation specialists in Albania; in his political career, PD deputy for Tirana in 1991; health minister 1992-93; PD general secretary 1993; PD chairman 1996.

Ridvan Bode

Minister of finance; originates from Korce; 37 years old; married; completed high school in Gjirokaster; graduated in finance; went to Montpellier in France for one year's postgraduate study in 1992, followed by further postgraduate study in the economy of rural development, also in France; acquired title of master of sciences; head of finance at an enterprise in Prenjas, 1982-90; lecturer at the Agricultural University of Tirana 1991-95; director of the General Customs Directorate from August 1995.

Halit Shamata

Interior minister; originates from Kavaje; 42 years old; poet; married, with two children; graduated with excellent results in language and literature in 1977; sent to Lekbibaj in Tropoje for biographical reasons; later teacher at Kryevidh near Kavaje and at the town's high

school; PD deputy for four years and later chairman of the Commission for Laws and Constitutional Issues; has published two volumes of poetry; speaks English, French, and Italian.

Kristofor Peci

Justice minister; originates from the village of Nivan near Gjirokaster; 50 years old; married, with three children; graduated in jurisprudence in 1968, and appointed as investigator to the Shkoder Procurator's Office; transferred to Diber as assistant procurator in 1975 after his father-in-law was convicted of treason, and seven years later transferred to Lezhe in the same position; appointed procurator in the Procurator-General's Office in 1991 and later judge at the Court of Cassation; speaks English.

Maksim Cikuli

Health minister; born in Korce; 43 years old; married, with two children; graduated with excellent results in medicine in 1974; worked as a doctor in the Gjegjan copper mine until 1979; later worked as lecturer at the medical faculty; specialized in genetics in France; has chaired the Special Pediatric Department at the Medical Faculty and the University Hospital Center in Tirana; bears the titles of doctor of sciences and professor; joins Meksi's cabinet for the second time as health minister; speaks English, French, and Italian.

Roza Pati

Secretary of state for youth and women; originates from Lezhe; 31 years old; married, with one child; graduated in English in 1988 and appointed to the English Department, but for "biographical" reasons sent to Lac as a high-school teacher; later elected in Lac as deputy chairwoman of the district council and later chairwoman; speaks English, Italian, and German.

Abdyl Khaja

Energy minister; originates from Elbasan, the eldest of seven children; 53 years old; married, with three children; graduated in economics in 1965; worked for 14 years as an economist at the Metallurgical Combine and later appointed as a chief specialist in metallurgy at the Industry Ministry; one year later director of the Planning Directorate; deputy minister in the Minister of Mining in the Stability Government; deputy prime minister and minister of industry in the Technical Government; in Meksi's cabinet for the second time.

Bamir Topi

Minister of agriculture and food; originates from Tirana; 39 years old; married, with two children; graduate in

director of the Third Directorate at the Foreign Ministry; is a doctor of linguistics; speaks English, French, and Italian.

Arlinda Keci

Minister of labor and social issues; originates from Tirana; 34 years old; married, with two children; graduated in economic planning; completed postgraduate studies at the University of Kent in England; subsequently worked for four years in the communal services enterprise; at the Labor Ministry since 1992, where she has been director of the Directorate of Social Issues; speaks English and Russian.

Edmond Lulja

Minister of education and sports; originates from Fier; 50 years old; married, with two children; graduated in mathematics with excellent results; worked as a teacher at the branch of the university in Fier from 1968 to 1975, and subsequently as a mathematics teacher at Fier High School until 1990; 1992-93, director of the Education Directorate in Fier; later director of the Directorate of Secondary Education at the Education Ministry; bears the title "Teacher of the People"; author of 10 mathematics textbooks for secondary schools; speaks English and Italian.

Sokol Bejleri

Secretary of state at the Ministry of Mining Resources and Energy; born in Fier; 36 years old; graduated as an oil engineer at the Engineering Faculty; has also worked at the Oil Institute; currently general director of oil; member of the PD since 1991 and currently member of the Presidium of the PD Fier Branch; speaks English.

Suzana Panariti

Minister of industry; originates from Tirana; is 40 years old; married, with one child; graduated in 1978 as an economist; worked for five years as an economist at the Mining Construction Enterprise in Tirana; completed special studies at the Planning Institute from 1983 to 1985; lecturer at the Economics Faculty after 1985 and subsequently departmental head; in 1994, appointed deputy minister of the Ministry of Industry and later minister; is a doctor of economics; speaks English and Italian.

Marjeta Pronjari

Secretary of state for sports; originates from Korce, 44 years old, married; graduate of the Higher Institute of Physical Culture; worked as an assistant lecturer for 10 years from 1971 to 1981; appointed lecturer in 1981, subsequently starting postgraduate study; in 1988

awarded title of "candidate of educational sciences," as the first woman in the field of sports; she became a doctor of educational sciences in the field of sports and also an assistant professor in 1991; in 1992, she was elected deputy president of the Olympic Committee; speaks German, Italian, and English.

Safet Zhulali

Minister of defense; born in Struga; 52 years old; married, with three daughters; graduated in mathematics in 1970; completed postgraduate study and afterwards worked at the secondary school in Peshkopi; founder of the democratic movement in Diber in December 1990 and subsequently PD chairman in Diber; became deputy in 1992 and appointed defense minister in the first Democratic government.

Albert Brojka

Minister of public works; originates from Tirana; 38 years old, married, with two children; a graduate in mining and geology with excellent results; worked for some time as a project engineer and subsequently as director of the Planning Institute; in 1993, was appointed adviser to the prime minister and one year later deputy minister of mining resources; appointed minister of industry in 1995; later PD chairman for Tirana; he has studied in Turkey and Japan; speaks English, Turkish, and Italian.

Robert Ceku

Secretary of state for tourism at the Ministry of Public Works; originates from Korce; 41 years old, married, with two children; graduated with excellent results in economics; worked in the Tirana Executive Committee and later as lecturer at the Economics Faculty; appointed director of the Directorate of Taxation; minister in the Technical Government and subsequently deputy finance minister; speaks English and Italian.

Albania: Berisha Hosts Banquet for Bundestag Official

*AU1507123996 Tirana ATA in English
1014 GMT 14 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 13 (ATA)—President of the Republic Sali Berisha gave a dinner on the honour of the head of Bundestag Foreign Policy Commission Dr Karl-Heinz Hornhues and the German Ambassador to Tirana Mr. Disdorn.

During the dinner which was characterised by a complete understanding, President Berisha discussed with the German guest the best relations existing between

the two countries, ways and perspectives of their development, Germany's significant support to Albania for the consolidation of democracy and rule of law, market economy and its integrity in European and Euro Atlantic institutions.

President Berisha said that the present situation in Albania is totally stabilised, the new government is determined to accelerate the reforms, the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and other political forces are engaged in a constructive and fruitful dialogue. While the SP, including its members and leader, is committed in a deep reformation of the party, removal of Marx, denunciation of Enver Hoxha and return to market principles and values of democracy.

He said to the German guest that the presence of Marx and replacement of a market economy with a mixed economy, non-denunciation of the communist dictatorship and horrible crimes of Enver Hoxha and Ramiz Alia, theory of dismantling of achievements reached in the last four years, advises of the extremists of the Greek lobby and their supporters to boycott not only the elections but also the votes' counting, were factors which defined a deep defeat and the worse political crisis in the Albanian left-wing on May 26. But, the latest development in the Socialist party are promising.

Berisha expressed his and government's determination to hold free and honest local elections and cooperate with the Council of Europe, parliaments and other friendly institutions.

Albania: Ceka, Imami Visit to U.S. Lacks 'Usual Splash'

*AU1407164396 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian
13 July 96 p 3*

[Unattributed commentary: "Two Clowns in the United States—Berisha's 'Victims' Stroll Around Washington"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The visit of Democratic Alliance leaders Ceka and Imami is now in its second day, but lacks its usual splash. For the first time, the Alliance leaders perceive a strong contrast between their visit and their publicity. Although their trip is entirely private, they have used it to meet one of the White House's emissaries, Ambassador Shifter, who, besides receiving them himself, has escorted them around other offices in order to exploit them against Berisha. Shifter's association with the two Albanian politicians, "born out of quarrels with Berisha," constitutes a most remarkable political coalition, because their American host now has political malice against Berisha's administration and policies as the sole aim of his political career. Berisha's

victims have thus gathered in Washington, and yesterday started an extensive religious and regional campaign against all Albanians who do show themselves as opponents of Berisha in Washington. The guerrilla style and publicity-free meetings have made the Alliance leaders homesick for the Cafe Fidel, where every gem they utter is recorded by a bunch of undersized boys who on the following day concoct dozens of articles, photocopies of which the Alliance leaders have taken with them to Washington. Thus the Shifter-Ceka-Imami trio shows spite toward Berisha that spans the ocean for the first time.

The "guests" in the United States apparently prefer not to "denounce" the elections, because not only they but their friend Shifter also, now know that the support of the so-called important party of the Democratic Alliance does not extend beyond 2 percent. The "visitors" from Albania in Washington are now denouncing Berisha's Islamic ties, his origins, and especially "the danger that Berisha poses to stability in the Balkans." It has also been reported that there was a ludicrous incident in the office of Congressman Lantos, in which Ceka was introduced as president of the Democratic Alliance, while Lantos had in front of him another visiting card belonging to Gramoz Pashko as president of the Democratic Alliance.

The Democratic Alliance has lost half their party with their departure and they have left the boys of the Fidel without news, but they will return to Albania again. We beg them not to then unveil to Arban Hasani some new plan for the Balkans, or different combinations of Americans to govern in Albania, because, as they did a year ago, they will cause confusion and laughter, which might again be heard across the ocean.

Albania: Commentary Views Threat of 'Freeze' in EU Relations

*AU1407170296 Tirana POLI I QENDRES
in Albanian 13 Jul 96 p 3*

[Commentary by B. Morina: "Europe: Economic Sanctions Against Tirana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Berisha's hopes of a soft attitude to the elections from the old continent have turned out to be in vain. Klaus Hensch, president of the European Parliament, has warned of a freeze in relations and the interruption of aid to Albania until the rigged elections of 26 May are repeated. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, Hensch has made it clear that the position of the EU toward the 26 May polls remains that of the resolution of the European Parliament, which in June called for a full repeat of the legislative elections. The statements by the parliament's number one come

at a time when European institutions have completed their assessments of the problematic Albanian elections. Following the European Parliament, the Council of Europe (of which our country has been a member since June 1995) and the OSCE, which was also an official election observer, have also called for new elections. It appears that the position of the parliament that assembles 15 EU countries will be essential as far as economic relations are concerned.

The Democratic Party and Berisha commented immediately after the EU resolution that it was left-wing influence that defined this stance, and that the resolution was of an advisory nature. In response to questions from the press, Tritan Shehu commented that "the European Parliament approves such resolutions every day." There was no way in which such arrogant reactions from Tirana and scornful statements by leading Albanian government politicians could fail to lead to tension and harsh responses from Brussels. The EU's reply now comes not in the form of statements and resolutions, but in an interruption of funds, a freeze in economic relations, and the cancellation of aid programs. All these matters pass through European organizations that are headed by the European Parliament. The Albanian leadership appears to have neglected this detail, because they have openly

stated that they trust in the help of powerful European friends such as France and Germany. Berisha and his men forget that decisions made at Union-level are to be applied by individual EU member states too. Thus, even those European countries that are ready to wink at the rigging of the elections, if indeed such countries exist, will be bound by the mechanism of the EU to adopt the same stand toward Albania as that of other governments. Moreover, the illegitimate government that has emerged from the 26 May elections will find it hard to survive on the support of only one two states. This is because economic aid from individual states is traditionally much more difficult to grant than aid from the EU. The governments of individual states demand much greater guarantees for their money than organizations that administer joint aid or investment funds. In this way, Tirana can do nothing but take Mr. Hensch's words seriously. The embargo against the former Yugoslavia has now come to an end, and the proceeds were used to sponsor concerts and pay for gasoline for the election campaign. It now remains to pay the salaries of the civil service, the police, and the National Intelligence Service, and then to secure our daily bread; otherwise, we will have to fall back on the grass option, as offered by Hoxha at the beginning of the sixties.

Bulgaria: Defense Council Official on Post-Cocom Group

AU1507142496 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
15 Jul 96 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Kolev, deputy chairman of the Intergovernment Council on the Defense Industry, by Lyubomir Denov; place and date not given: "Russia Helped Us To Join Post-Cocom"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Denov] Mr. Kolev, why was our entry into post-Cocom [post-Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] delayed?

[Kolev] In my opinion, the only reason is the suspiciousness, a legacy of the recent past. However, now all this has been overcome.

[Denov] Is it true that Russia opposed us joining the club?

[Kolev] Russia has always supported us. The things written in certain newspapers are complete fiction. I personally took part in negotiations with leaders of the Russian military-industrial complex and can state that they never expressed any reservations about our candidature.

[Denov] What does our acceptance into post-Cocom mean for Bulgaria?

[Kolev] Our acceptance as a member of the so-called Wassenaar Agreement is primarily recognition that we are one of the leading world arms producers.

[Denov] How will our defense industry change in practical terms?

[Kolev] We cannot expect that rivers of new technologies will flow to us. They cost a lot of money. However, now we can raise the question of joint production activities with Western states with far more confidence.

[Denov] What compromises did Bulgaria make so as to be able to join post-Cocom?

[Kolev] It is not a question of compromises, but rather of providing some confidential information. I would like to point out that we have assumed our rightful place among the founders of post-Cocom. Failure to admit us would have made the existence of the agreement itself pointless.

Bulgaria: Arms Plant Workers Return, Demand More Pay

AU1507161396 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
13 Jul 96 p 10

[Article by Nedyalka Filipova: "8,000 Arsenal Workers Want Wages of \$100"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 15 July, the trade unions at the Arsenal Arms Plant in Kazanluk will ask the management to increase the average monthly wages of employees at the plant to the equivalent of \$100.

On 15 July, the 8,000 Arsenal workers who were sent home on compulsory paid and unpaid leave on 1 May will return to their jobs. The reason for the vacation was the plant's serious production and financial crisis.

The situation has not yet changed significantly. In recently concluded deals, the sales department has managed to find clients for special products valued at \$14 million, however, the total quantity of stockpiled production is estimated to be worth \$60 million. KONTINENT has found out that the temporary closure of the plant has also saved about 100 million leva that would have been used to purchase materials.

The trade unions complained that they had still not received the analyses of the Arsenal Plant's economic state for the first quarter of the year.

The workers expect to receive their wages for April on 25 July. On 25 September, they will receive their back pay for June, July, and August. Yesterday, the Arsenal management declined to comment on the financial and economic situation at the arms plant.

Bulgaria: Union Leader Accuses Cabinet of Deal With IMF

AU1507125796 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 15 Jul 96
pp 1, 4

[Article by Krasimira Georgieva: "Hyperinflation Was Allegedly Arranged With IMF"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 14 July, Krustyu Petkov, leader of the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], accused the government of secretly arranging with the International Monetary Fund to use hyperinflation as a means to rehabilitate the economy. A multiple devaluation of the lev allegedly formed part of the deal. Apart from this, the government intends to sell off the largest state-owned companies at one-third of their true value. Professor Petkov claimed that these three accords formed the undisclosed part of the parameters of the deal with the IMF.

According to Petkov, Bulgarians' incomes will decline by 2.5 percent compared to March if the cabinet adopts its own procedure for wages compensation. Four months ago, the average national monthly wage equaled \$122. Following the inflation boom and the fall in the exchange rate, it is now barely \$67. At present, the minimum monthly pension is equivalent to \$12.50, while the minimum wage after income tax is below \$20. The KNSB leader warned that the average monthly wage will fall below \$50 if the cabinet today approves the compensation mechanisms proposed by Mincho Koralski, minister of labor and social affairs. The increase in wages will barely compensate for half the expected rise in prices, the unions claimed.

The KNSB, Podkrepa Labor Confederation, and the Bulgarian Economic Chamber propose linking wages and salaries with the dollar rate and inflation as of 1 September. The trade unions and employers want the finance minister to coordinate the updating of the 1996 budget with the social partners. Attempts have already been made to impose unrealistic indices: 16 percent inflation for July, 3.5 percent for August, and a gradual reduction to 2 percent per month in December this year. Other measures demanded by the social partners include bringing in the private banks to service the state budget and reviewing the list of companies earmarked for liquidation and isolation.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Allegedly Plans 'State of Emergency'

AU1607125696 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 13 Jul 96
p 12

[Commentary by Ekaterina Mikhaylova, National Assembly deputy of Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), and Aleksandur Bozhkov, deputy chairman of SDS National Coordinating Council: "The Bulgarian Socialist Party Is Leading Us Toward a State of Emergency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For several months now, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government has been writhing in a dilemma, unable to choose between the impossibility of admitting the tragedy of the bread supplies and the need to provide vitally needed amounts of wheat, flour, and bread to every Bulgarian. The grain problem can be solved in two ways. The first, normal way is for the government to announce precise figures on the grain exported, the quantities that have to be imported, and the size of the expected harvest; to propose ways to finance the purchase of grain from local producers; to provide money from the budget to compensate consumers for the difference in price owing to the import of grain at international prices; and to ask the National Assembly to approve the cabinet's actions and the costs thereof. The second way, as is always

the case, involves officials at the Agriculture Ministry keeping their mouths tight shut, the secret import of grain by Neftokhim at an undisclosed cost, continuous closed meetings of the government and Agriculture Ministry, the granting of special new powers to the oblast administrators to interfere in the distribution and reallocation of grain and flour, police operations to "catch" private bakers who are "hiding" flour, and unlimited rises in the price of bread, leading to hunger and long lineups.

Everything indicates that the Socialist government has chosen the second way. The government's actions to solve the grain crisis are shrouded in secrecy. This is no accident. The prime minister, oblast administrators, and ministers are well aware that by their actions they are infringing both the laws of the land and the Constitution. During the 45-year rule of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the laws and the Constitution were used as the party found expedient. They turned their backs on the laws or adapted them every time that they contradicted the "party line," or when it was necessary to cover up a shady deal or to show favor to certain "comrades."

Five years after the champagne celebration of the adoption of the new Constitution, when Bulgaria was declared to be "a democratic social state governed by the rule of law," the government simply cannot be allowed to commit acts such as the following:

1. To make secret decisions permitting oblast administrators to lay their hands on emergency grain and flour reserves.
2. To send the police to search private bakeries for "hidden" flour.
3. To order private and even state flour mills to sell flour to certain customers at fixed prices.
4. To force the Neftokhim Refinery to conclude unprofitable barter deals for the supply of naphtha and gasoline in return for grain.
5. To eliminate the state bodies responsible for monitoring grain imports, to commission private firms close to the party to carry out analyses of wheat imports, and then conceal the results of these analyses.

Zlatimir Orsov, the spokesman on BSP agricultural policy, has already announced that the following action will be taken: A special law will be passed on grain trading to permit the government to requisition the farmers' grain crops and to remove from the market all traders and "speculators" in grain, apart from the state traders and those controlled by the BSP. This requisition will take place according to special "state of emergency" regulations, which the agriculture minister

or prime minister will announce for a particular region or for the entire country.

The Constitution clearly defines what a state of emergency is and which human rights are suspended while it is in force. To deprive Bulgarian citizens of these rights is the cherished dream of Zhan Videnov's party. When there is no bread and no money to pay for electricity and central heating, the BSP will stifle the voices of the media, arrest awkward people, ban rallies and demonstrations, tap telephones, and read private letters. The party will send us on forced labor, seize our homes, and exile us to other areas.

All this can happen if a State of Emergency Act is passed by 121 votes in the debating hall of the National Assembly.

Bulgaria: Dispute Over Daily Threatens To Split SDS

*AU1207152196 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian
No. 27, 11-17 Jul 96 pp 17-18*

[Article by Miroslava Belcheva: "SDS Also Has Its Own Circle of Friends"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Coordinating Council of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] often meets in the "Krasno Selo" building, which is used for weddings and other ceremonies, and on Friday 5 July, there was something symbolic about this. In the building used by people for weddings, the SDS family came near to breaking up. The leaders of the small parties and rank-and-file officials accused the National Coordinating Council chiefs of unforgivable betrayal. These so-called small leaders have been unhappy for a long time that Ivan Kostov and his entourage are deciding the fate of the coalition in a high-handed way. Apparently, the most recent move by Kostov's circle of friends, namely to dismiss six journalists from the DEMOKRATSIYA newspaper and to appoint Neven Kopandanova as chief editor, was for them the last straw. At an extraordinary session of the SDS coordinating council for media policy, the "small leaders" threatened to leave the coalition. The internal opposition dropped an unmistakable hint that it would demand the resignation of SDS Deputy Chairman Aleksandur Bozhkov.

"Kostov lost control of his nerves, and the tension was unbearable," a participant in the meeting said. However, the SDS leader managed to restrain himself and avoid repeating the tricks of the past, when SDS headquarters showed its hatred for rebellious members and expelled those who refused to mend their ways.

Is SDS Unity Threatened by a Woman Journalist?

Over half the members of the National Coordinating Council demanded the resignation of Neven Kopandanova, whom the SDS National Executive Council had appointed editor in chief of DEMOKRATSIYA. SDS unity will be destroyed if she remains in this post, supporters of Filip Dimitrov and Edvin Sugarev claimed in arguing their case. Ivan Kostov did not even put the issue to a vote. He himself assumed the responsibility for the changes in the SDS organ, which is now a national daily. Disappointed, Filip Dimitrov lamented the new image adopted by the SDS and its newspaper and the fact that it had broken so totally with the old one. Ivan Kurtev directly threatened to withdraw his Social Democratic Party from the SDS.

"The commotion over DEMOKRATSIYA and the threats to leave the SDS are in effect an attack on the National Executive Council," presidential candidate Petur Stoyanov is reported to have said, shocked by the risk that his own people were exposing him to before the elections.

However, the split did not happen, as the two sides in the dispute on "what is happening in DEMOKRATSIYA and who owns the newspaper" managed to agree on one thing, namely that the SDS should not disgrace itself in public and should hide the scandal from the media. Accordingly, following a stormy seven-hour session of the National Coordinating Council, the SDS leaders merely announced that the case had been decided by appointing an editorial board for DEMOKRATSIYA, which was composed of "experienced journalists and politically responsible people from the SDS," plus representatives of the publishing syndicate and the Demokratiya Foundation.

What Is the SDS Trying To Hide?

Another, less noteworthy secret is that dozens of SDS functionaries accused Ivan Kostov of authoritarianism. Recently, Filip Dimitrov's supporters have been ignored, and regard themselves as mere supernumeraries in a play staged by one or two directors. The National Executive Council, consisting of Ivan Kostov, Aleksandur Bozhkov, Nadezhda Mikhaylova, Vasil Gotsev, Khristo Biserov, and Yordan Sokolov, adopts decisions without the approval of the National Coordinating Council, on which all the parties are represented. "Kostov arranges the meetings so that he always gets his way," complains Evgeni Mikhaylov, who represents Ecoglasnost on the National Coordinating Council. His words were also confirmed by activists from the New Social Democratic Party, Radical Democratic Party, and Republican Party. They are troubled by the fact that the

members of the National Executive Council, together with presidential candidate Petur Stoyanov and Neven Kopandanova, form something like an SDS "Orion." "This is the DEMOKRATSIYA circle of friends," one of the small party leaders commented. Formerly, the SDS newspaper was controlled by one circle of friends, now it is controlled by another, Aleksandur Yordanov and Simeon Goshev declared independently of one another. They had in mind the golden days of the stabbings in the back, when Filip Dimitrov, Evgeni Mikhaylov, and Konstantin Mishev occupied positions of power in the coalition and its newspaper.

Edvin Sugarev even described the dirty dealings of the "circle of friends" in an eight-page letter to Ivan Kostov. "It is not clear who is exercising ownership rights over the newspaper. It is not clear under which powers responsible decisions are adopted. Following the changes in DEMOKRATSIYA, the SDS National Assembly deputies have been swamped with hundreds of letters from unhappy sympathizers. The newspaper is politically impotent. The dismissals are made on personal or political grounds, not for professional reasons...." the Ecoglasnost leader writes in his frank letter to Kostov. In his letter, Sugarev reportedly makes the open accusation to Kostov that the SDS leadership has done what it likes since the end of 1994, without consulting either the publishing syndicate or the National Coordinating Council.

The National Coordinating Council reportedly wanted the SDS to retain the controlling package of shares in DEMOKRATSIYA through the eponymous publishing syndicate and to sell the rest of the shares, transforming the newspaper into a joint stock company. However, under pressure from the National Executive Council, the National Coordinating Council accepted a different distribution: 51 percent of the shares were to remain in the hands of the SDS, 8 percent were to be held by the publishing syndicate, and 6 percent by the Demokratiya Foundation. Nevertheless, according to Sugarev this did not happen. Documents were submitted to the court for the registration of Demokratiya AD [Joint Stock Company], with the SDS holding 2 percent of the shares, the publishing syndicate headed by Agov holding 91 percent, and the remainder held by the Demokratiya Foundation. None of the "simple mortals" in the publishing syndicate knew anything about the switch in the distribution of ownership. In addition, without any decision by the competent body, Aleksandur Bozhkov was appointed chairman of the board of directors of the joint stock company.

Be this as it may, the court refused to register Demokratiya AD, and Kostov and Bozhkov gave confused and legally unacceptable explanations about this to the Na-

tional Coordinating Council. Following the magistrates' rejection, an application was made to register Demokratiya OOD [Single Proprietorship with limited liability], headed by Neven Kopandanova, Asen Agov, and Nikolay Danev, executive director of the Demokratiya Foundation. This was also done without the knowledge of the National Coordinating Council.

Someone is trying to privatize DEMOKRATSIYA under the counter, Edvin Sugarev and Filip Dimitrov warn. They insinuate that Aleksandur Bozhkov, an experienced financial dealer, has taken on the task, and that matters now lie in his hands. In his letter to Kostov, the Ecoglasnost leader [Sugarev] insists that Neven Kopandanova be removed, and aims his sights even higher: "I hope that the National Executive Council will find a suitable way of limiting the powers and appetites of Aleksandur Bozhkov before the next national conference."

Money

The SDS internal opposition is furious that the SDS is linked with financial groups with which it previously waged war. When Nadezhda Mikhaylova announced that DEMOKRATSIYA has many lucrative advertising contracts with Iliya Pavlov, a member of the Republican Party concluded that "Multigroup and God knows which mafia groups are in fact sponsoring the SDS!"

However, at the extraordinary meeting of the National Coordinating Council, it emerged that the SDS leaders are relying more on foreign than domestic aid. Ivan Kostov reportedly announced that he was holding talks with the Springer media concern in Germany on financial assistance for DEMOKRATSIYA. The Germans reportedly told him that they can provide a wide circle of investors for the Bulgarian press, but refused to give one pfennig to a party newspaper. Springer was reportedly ready to help independent publications in Bulgaria and to lend a helping hand in creating a right-wing sector of the media spectrum, in which the SDS may count only on discrete aid, not direct assistance. In the view of the German experts, DEMOKRATSIYA has minimum chances of making a profit. These and other facts connected with the newspaper's serious position caused a postponement of the battle for DEMOKRATSIYA. However, it appears that neither of the two sides intends to capitulate.

Although a temporary truce has been declared, the war between the old and new SDS image may be disastrous. This conflict is reminiscent of the struggle for supremacy between the "small" and the "big" parties in the coalition, which filled the state with political rejects and led to defeat in the 1994 parliamentary elections.

Bulgaria: Zhelev's Call for Presidential Republic Viewed

AU1507150496 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 15 Jul 96 p 6

[Commentary by Ana-Mariya Pavlova: "Will Zhelev Be a Second Czar Nikolas?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhelev demanded more power through amending the Constitution precisely on the fifth anniversary of the adoption of the basic law.

However, the call will remain a voice in the wilderness. Zhelev has decided to become the czar of an unsuitable nation at an unsuitable time.

At first glance, some of the things the president said on 13 July seemed true, namely that the Constitution is not working; a struggle exists between the institutions; and crime, corruption, and poverty are rampant.

Only a strong presidential republic will put things right, Zhelev explained to the people. "The Constitution is not a holy cow. When the machinery of state that it has created does not function efficiently and productively, then a change is needed," the head of state pointed out. In other words, the president advises cutting off the head of the cow that produces no milk. He proceeded to cite Russia as an example, which under the leadership of a strong president has progressed far ahead. Here lies Zhelev's first delusion.

The recent elections showed that no free press exists in Russia. Yeltsin's strong hand is failing to cope with the conflict in Chechnya, nor will he stop the wave of assassinations in Moscow. Probably the reason lies with the alcoholically induced tremor of the right hand, but this does not alter the situation.

Parliament is surviving as a convention and governs everything in Bulgaria from the radio to the courts, Zhelev also said on Saturday evening. Here again he is confused. The Constitutional Court revoked the powers of the media commission, so that the radio, television, and BTA can do anything they like. They only have to ask.

Regarding Videnov's attempts to influence the judiciary, the banking system, and the selection of ambassadors, the president can only be angry with himself. It is true that he cannot initiate legislation. On the other hand, he can boast of having quite a strong lobby among the opposition, in the People's Union and the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms]. It is no problem for him to commission a few deputies to submit the draft laws that he wants. Most of these laws are envisioned in the transitional and concluding clauses of the Constitution.

By appealing for an amendment of the Constitution, the president shows that he is fed up with being powerless. Each of his vetoes is immediately overthrown by the parliamentary majority. He probably hopes that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], believing it will win the presidential elections, may seize the bait and grant more powers to its own man. If the Left decides to do so, and the opposition adds a few votes, then the three-fourths majority needed to amend the Constitution is ready. In this manner, the president might win part of the trust that Simeon II enjoys.

The idea of amending the Constitution also has another aim. Under the Constitution, the president has the power to dissolve the National Assembly three months before the end of its term. In the event of a crisis, he appoints a caretaker government, but parliament continues to function. In the present situation, if Zhelev nonetheless decides to run again, he might be able to count on his own cabinet which, however, would be under Socialist control.

The BSP politicians are clearly aware that the crisis will intensify in the autumn, and it is possible that the government may fall. Pirinski's presidential victory is far from certain either, in view of the problem with his citizenship. For these reasons, no one is prepared to assume the risk of amending the Constitution.

After a time, Zhelev will no doubt propose his idea again, but as a former president lecturing students at Western universities.

Bulgaria: Presidential Republic Considered Unlikely

AU1507144796 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 15 Jul 96 p 9

[Commentary by Todor Tokin: "Presidential Republic Still Lies in the Bright Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the weekend, the two advocates of a presidential republic again made their presence known. In his address on radio and television on Saturday, 13 July, Dr. Zhelev called for the amendment of the Constitution to change to a presidential republic. In an interview in TRUD on 14 July, George Ganchev [leader of Bulgarian Business Bloc] also argued for such a form of government, also proposing a national referendum on the issue.

Neither Zhelev nor Ganchev said anything new. Both of them blame parliament for all the evils that have befallen the country during the last five years. "The present chaos, the spreading corruption in the state apparatus, and the lack of coordination in the actions for the various state institutions are largely due to

the parliamentary government," Zhelev said. George Ganchev described the top state officials as "a bunch of servile, bureaucratic riffraff who are engaged in rackets everywhere, with everything, and at all times."

Perhaps both Zhelev and Ganchev are right. However, are they capable of becoming presidents of a presidential republic, as they want?

For example, what hindered the presidential institution led by Dr. Zhelev from "ensuring continuity in the work of succeeding governments," as the head of state declared in his statement? What kind of continuity did he ensure between the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] government and the one led by his own economic adviser Berov?

The president did not pick the best example by citing the presidential republic of Russia, "which, lacking any democratic traditions, began the reforms two and a half years later than Bulgaria, but today has far outstripped us in privatization and the attraction of foreign investments." Republics with parliamentary governments, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, are even further in front of Russia.

In the National Assembly, George Ganchev gained attention only by his threat as chairman of the parliamentary media commission to jail chief editors of newspapers, as used to happen in Great Britain. A check carried out by TRUD established that newspaper editors in

Great Britain indeed rotted in jail, but this happened a century ago, in the time of Charles Dickens. If Ganchev is really arguing that we return as a presidential republic to the times of the great English writer, then it is a pity that only he has noticed this, having lived for so many years in Dickens' native country.

A further point is that the two-party model that has become established in our country will allow a presidential republic only over its dead body. In the 36th National Assembly, an unprecedented consensus of 180 votes was achieved in favor of an amendment to the Constitution—not, however, in favor of a presidential republic, but of restricting the president's rights.

For the Constitution to be amended to establish a presidential republic, a third political force will be needed; this force will have to win a three-fourths majority in some future National Assembly and then demand the convening of a Grand National Assembly. Only a Grand National Assembly can decide to amend Article 1 of the Constitution, according to which "Bulgaria is a republic with a parliamentary government." Neither Zhelev nor Ganchev would be able to declare: "Look, here is such a party."

Thus, at least for the moment, the presidential republic lies somewhere in the bright future, as incidentally is the case with everything else in Bulgaria.

Slovakia: Meciar Against Presidential Pardon for Kovac Jr.

AU1507131696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
13 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "ic": "Government Was Familiarizing Itself With Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Humenne, Snina—[Passage omitted] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) organized a rally in Humenne in the late afternoon on Friday [12 July]. One of the questions from the plenum concerned President Michal Kovac's latest activities in relation to the case of his son. "This case is a matter for criminal prosecution bodies, which are independent of the government," said HZDS Chairman and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. "The investigator and the judge are bound by law. A farce is taking place at the moment, however, when the father wants to grant amnesty to his son, who is being prosecuted at home, and to his companions and free them of their criminal liability. This is unacceptable, also from the political viewpoint. The president wants to remove them from the sphere of jurisdiction of Slovak Republic bodies. It is also a farce because we have known from December 1995 that, if Kovac Jr.'s companions are granted pardon in Slovakia, they will go to Germany. They figure that they will receive three years there, and Michal Kovac Sr. will grant them pardon in Slovakia. In return, they will take the blame upon themselves, and Michal Kovac Jr. will be innocent. We have known that since December 1995. What is happening now is a continuation of all the steps with which I disagree and that I condemn. The law applies to everyone, to my son in the same way as to the son of the president."

Slovakia: Foundation Working To Shorten Kovac's Term

AU1607092596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
in Slovak 15 Jul 96 pp 1, 4

[Report by Jozef Krosiak: "The Goal Is To Protect Human Rights; The Authorities Have Registered a Civic Foundation Set Up To Shorten Michal Kovac's Presidency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—"What is being done to the detriment of the Slovak Republic by its president, Michal Kovac, must not go unheeded. He should have resigned a long time ago. There would be less confrontation and more understanding in Slovakia. Slovak history will take note of this gentleman, but only as a polarizing element in our community," said Dr. Ladislav Babiak from Hontianske Nemce, founder and plenipotentiary of the Kvietok (Blossom) foundation, in a statement to SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. The

Krupina District Office registered this foundation at the beginning of July.

The Kvietok foundation was set up with the goal of shortening the term of citizen Michal Kovac in the post of president of the Slovak Republic. It is based in Hontianske Nemce and is a legal person set up in conformity with the provisions of the appropriate laws and the Civic Code. As transpires from its statutes, under the heading "goals and mission," the foundation has been set up to protect the human rights of those citizens of the Slovak Republic who, for specific reasons, have expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of citizen Michal Kovac in the post of president of the Slovak Republic, have demanded his immediate resignation, and whose rights to do so have not been respected.

The foundation wants to protect the rights of citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the Charter of Basic Human Rights, so it is seeking the departure of Michal Kovac from the post of president as soon as possible, in compliance with the appropriate legal guidelines. The foundation also supports similar efforts of natural and legal persons, including the National Council of the Slovak Republic, which expressed its lack of confidence in President Michal Kovac and asked for his resignation. The statutes of the Kvietok foundation list as sources of income contributions from legal and natural persons, sponsorship by commercial and other entrepreneurial entities, and specific donations from citizens with permanent residences at home and abroad.

Use of Financial Resources

As the foundation's founder and plenipotentiary informed us, the financial resources acquired in this way will be used by the foundation to document expeditiously the activity of President Michal Kovac and publicize the results in the interest of truthfully informing citizens about his negative role in relation to the development of democracy and the Slovak Republic's statehood. Furthermore, the foundation will publish printed material and produce features for the electronic media which will clarify the president's deeds that are damaging the reputation and good name of the Slovak Republic in the context of international relations. At the same time, the financial resources should be used to publish special bulletins and periodicals that will thoroughly survey the activities of the head of state in his office, to work on printed material in harmony with the foundation's aims, to pay authors' fees, and to create an information database in support of a referendum on expeditiously terminating the president's term of office. The foundation will provide from its funds contributions for activities in support of the aforementioned aims

on the basis of written requests. The amount of contributions will be determined by the administrator of the foundation, together with a specialized board of consultants. The Kvietok foundation will cease its operations on the day Michal Kovac resigns from the post of president of the Slovak Republic.

Slovakia: Daily Names Alleged Russian Secret Service Officers

AU1507145896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
15 Jul 96 p 23

[TASR report: "Former KGB Officers Reportedly in Bratislava"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Jan Langos, last federal minister of interior, who is now chairman of the Democratic Party [DS], has indications that a representative of the Russian secret service FSB, the successor to the KGB, is operating officially in Slovakia. This is General Vosko Boynikov, the Czech daily PRACE wrote in its 13 July issue. "After 1989, Minister Sacher signed an agreement with the KGB on the operation of its representative in Czechoslovakia. I pushed through the cancellation of the agreement and expelled Boynikov," the daily quotes Jan Langos as saying. According to unofficial information, the training of Slovak Information Service [SIS] specialists by Russian intelligence officers took place in Bratislava last week. "In what can the SIS be trained by former KGB officers, who have, all their lives, been trained against NATO? This is enough for Slovakia to be unacceptable for NATO. This is a clear signal on the part of the Slovak Government of its lack of interest in NATO membership," Jan Langos added for PRACE.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 13 July on page 3 carries a 200-word report by "rzi" on a DS briefing held on 12 July, which states: "At the next meeting of parliament, the opposition will demand the dismissal of SIS Director Ivan Lexa and a thorough control of the SIS, which, according to DS Deputy Chairman Frantisek Sebej, has severed all contacts with the intelligence services of NATO member states and is intensively developing relations with the successor to the KGB, the Russian secret service. 'The very activity of the SIS is a reason for the Slovak Republic not to be admitted into NATO,' Sebej said. In his opinion, it is unacceptable for NATO countries that the SIS is oriented eastwards and is suspected of criminal activity."]

Slovakia: Ties With Russian Intelligence Hinder NATO Entry

AU1607080596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Jul 96
p 4

[Commentary by Peter Toth: "Threat to NATO Entry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the end of the cold war, in addition to other important changes, the orientation and work methods of intelligence services all over the world have also changed. In the postcommunist states, this change was all the more complicated as their intelligence services had been terrorist organizations enforcing the will of the political elite by perpetrating violence against citizens of their own countries. Or, to be more precise, a situation developed in which the communist intelligence services were frequently the ones formulating the intentions of the regime. In the neighboring central European states, the transformation of the intelligence services has been rather successful. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, but also Slovenia, have intelligence services that collaborate closely with the services of the NATO states in combating organized terror and trade in arms and radioactive materials. Until recently, Slovakia also had such a secret service. NATO diplomats were full of praise for cooperation with our SIS [Slovak Information Service]. The freshly appointed SIS Director Ivan Lexa was among those invited to last year's summit of the chiefs of special services from the Visegrad Four countries. Let us recall that this was prior to the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr. abroad. This year, Lexa was not invited to an analogous meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, because his colleagues from central and western Europe consider him to be responsible for this crime.

The kidnapping of the young Kovac is the epitome of the Slovak reality. If this were a singular occurrence, it would have been possible (under normal circumstances) to replace the SIS leadership and show that the SIS belongs to the club of services confirming the orientation of their governments toward NATO and the EU. However, the SIS has its sole official attaché (as given) only in Moscow and it maintains busy relations with the foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation. Its experts come to Bratislava to train SIS officers and our officers go to Moscow and attend all kinds of work-study programs there. Under the era of the former SIS leadership, our intelligence officers used to go to the British MI5 and MI6 for training.

It seems that the Slovak Government has changed its foreign policy orientation and is adapting the orientation of the SIS to this. Our entry into NATO is, indeed, seriously threatened.

Slovakia: Reaction Viewed to Budapest's Autonomy Call

AU1507144296 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Jul 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Bucharest Reacts to Controversial Theses From Budapest More Soberly Than Bratislava"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest's official reaction to the document from the recent Hungarian-Hungarian conference in Budapest stands in sharp contrast to the vehement reactions on the Slovak side. Romania first asked, through diplomatic channels, for a statement clarifying some of the theses contained in the document, and reserved the right to react subsequently.

This attitude has several dimensions. First, Romania is much stronger than Hungary, in every respect, and it therefore need not fear a potential threat from its neighbor. On the other hand, in view of the geopolitical realities, Romania is dependent in its Euroatlantic aspirations on correct, if not friendly, relations with Budapest, because Hungary would be its only connecting link to both NATO and the EU.

One aspect, which concerns Slovakia, should not be neglected either, however. By its restraint vis-a-vis the controversial theses from Budapest, especially in comparison with the muscle-flexing statements, smacking sometimes of hysteria, by some Slovak political forces, Bucharest has gotten its chance to rap Vladimir Meciar over the knuckles for his nonfulfillment of verbal agreements regarding the signing of the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty in March 1995.

Diplomacy is a very subtle instrument availing itself of an extensive range of tones and undertones, on which a skillful politician can literally work wonders. Romanian diplomacy has shown over decades that, despite the long years of Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regime, it has not forgotten this art.

The situation in Slovakia is different. In its arrogance, the present government was so bold as to get rid of even the small number of experienced diplomats who were ready, after the federation's breakup, to serve it. The awarding of diplomatic functions on the basis of party membership cards and jerseys, the second round of which is expected in the nearest future, will inevitably manifest itself in Slovakia's continued behavior in the

international arena in the style of the proverbial elephant in a china shop.

Instead of a search for consensus between the coalition and the opposition, at least in the foreign policy sphere, instead of a unification of forces for the benefit of the much-touted national and state interest, the coalition's commissars are completing the cleansing of the foreign service. The sole criterion that the new representatives must meet is loyalty to the master. Competence is mentioned only in second or third place, to say nothing of diplomatic training for top positions.

At the same time, Meciar's government is in a tight spot because of the consequences of its vulgar domestic policy, and also its not exactly legible foreign policy, for which it is trying to blame the opposition. These tactics are very transparent, however, even if they may have an impact on a section of the public for some time. Yet the moment of truth will come, and who knows, it could become the moment of condemnation of false prophets. Only it may be too late to cry over a wasted opportunity. Not for pensioners, but for the future of our children and grandchildren.

Slovakia: Army To Train Arms Industry Specialists in Trencin

AU1507154196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 Jul 96 p 2

[TASR report: "President in Liptov"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Liptovsky Mikulas—The commencement ceremony for 260 graduates of the Slovak National Uprising Military Academy was held in Liptovsky Mikulas on Friday [12 July], in the presence of Slovak President Michal Kovac. In his speech the president expressed appreciation, among other things, for the school's results in international military exercises. [passage omitted]

At a meeting with functionaries of the Slovak National Uprising Military Academy, Miroslav Zak, the academy's rector, informed the president about the establishment of the academy's special outlying workplace in Trencin, where a civilian course of study focusing on special arms production will be inaugurated in the next academic year.

Slovakia: Privatization of Telecom Enterprise Discussed

AU1507162996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Jul 96
p 2

[Report by "alg": "The Decision on Privatizing Slovenske Telekomunikacie Must Be Made by the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava— "Telecommunications depend not only on what is going on in Slovakia, but also on developments in the neighboring countries. In order not to remain a blank spot in the middle of Europe, we should let in one big operator who would bring money for development but, above all, know-how," Engineer Peter Valent, director general of the Slovenske Telekomunikacie [Slovak Telecommunications—ST] Bratislava state enterprise, told SME. According to Valent, the privatization of ST must be preceded by its transformation because a company operating according to the Commercial Code adapts to the conditions of the market more easily than a state enterprise. ST will need approximately 48 billion Slovak korunas [Sk] for its development by the year 2000. "The government must say what it is ready to give for us to build the necessary infrastructure. A 25 percent increase of ST's basic capital and the entry of a strategic partner are expected. A similar strategy has already started to bear fruit in the Czech Republic—they set themselves enormous tasks there and are progressing at a great speed. If we are not able to catch up with them, we will get into great problems," Peter Valent said. Speculations about ST's privatization and the dispute over claims being enforced by the SIPOX company are only intended to divert attention, according to Valent. "Everyone thinks that ST is a lucrative company and strives to halt its privatization because he is not involved in it," Peter Valent said.

National Council of the Slovak Republic Deputy Miroslav Kocnar, chairman of the United Party of Labor, declared on 11 July that, based on a deputy's survey, he arrived at the opinion that ST will soon be privatized. ST is subject to the law on strategic companies, the decision on whose privatization must be made by the government.

Slovakia: European Liberals Pass Resolution on Slovakia

AU1507155196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Jul 96
p 1

[Interview with Kalman Petoecz, foreign secretary of the Hungarian Civic Party, by Jana Pankovcinova; place and

date not given: "European Structure Will Not Tolerate the Slovak Government's Unwillingness Much Longer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a meeting in Vienna yesterday, the European Liberal Party (ELDR) passed a critical resolution on the situation in Slovakia. The meeting was also attended by Kalman Petoecz.

[Pankovcinova] What does the resolution say?

[Petoecz] It calls on the government and the prime minister to ensure the proportional representation of the opposition in parliamentary committees and in supervising the secret service and the electronic media. The resolution states that the law on foundations will have a negative impact on nongovernmental organizations in the Slovak Republic. Regarding minorities, it criticizes the fact that the law on the use of minorities' languages still has not been approved, in defiance of the prime minister's promises. It also criticizes the territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic and the nonexistence of a mechanism for the minorities' participation in decisionmaking processes.

[Pankovcinova] The Slovak Republic received similar resolutions in the past from various European political parties and their associations, but this criticism is also contained in the demarches of the EU countries, the United States, or the European Parliament [EP]. Nevertheless, the opposition still does not participate in the supervision of power in the manner customary in Western democracies.

[Petoecz] The ELDR resolution essentially reiterates to the prime minister the warnings contained in the EP resolution that if he does not secure, even in the future, the observance of democratic principles and human rights, including minority rights, the EU will be forced to suspend its programs of assistance and cooperation within the framework of the association agreement. I have the impression that the European political structures will not patiently tolerate much longer the Slovak Government's unwillingness to apply basic democratic principles in society.

[Pankovcinova] How do you assess the endeavor of the Slovak National Party [SNS] to initiate within the framework of the coalition a discussion on the Slovak Republic's withdrawal from the Slovak-Hungarian treaty?

[Petoecz] As a completely hazardous game with Slovakia's future. It is clear to everyone that the treaty is one of the conditions for the Slovak Republic's integration into European structures. SNS statements bear out that this party is not worthy of being in the government. If the SNS believes that it will improve its image and heal its frustrations from having been humiliated and

crushed by Meciar by playing the so-called Hungarian card and inciting hatred, it is a pinnacle of irresponsibility. The SNS simply lacks a sense of democratic political culture.

Slovakia: Meciar Says GM Offer for ZTS Dubnica Not Serious

AU1607084896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Jul 96 p 1

[CTK report: "During Visit to Snina, Vladimir Meciar Claimed Among Vihorlat Workers That General Motors Did Not Want Dubnica Heavy Engineering Works Even for 1 Koruna"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kosice/Snina—Some 200 admirers and opponents of Slovak cabinet chief Vladimir Meciar impatiently awaited the convoy of BMWs at the parking lot of the Vihorlat Snina shareholding company in Humenne District in east Slovakia, where the government held its regular external [vyjezdove] session on 12 July. [passage omitted]

"Why don't we have any work?," comes a question from the crowd. "Why isn't the government doing anything for me? I have to provide for a family. Why shouldn't I, after 24 years on the job, have at least the same salary as some youngster who has just finished school and is sitting in some office?," asks another man. The prime minister explains that this is exactly why he came to Snina, to discuss with the firm management the fate of people who have lost work as a result of conversion, to discuss with management the possibilities of new production programs and possible state support in solving the company's indebtedness.

Suddenly, a bearded Romany standing in the back makes himself heard: "Mr. Meciar, today I heard on the radio that you did not help Dubnica when you swept off the table the proposal of the American firm General Motors."

"That is not true," the prime minister thunders. "I will tell you how it was. Look, we offered to sell GM (ZTS) [Heavy Engineering Works] Dubnica for 1 koruna. They said they do not want Dubnica because their managers would have nowhere to live."

The prime minister claims that he proposed to the Americans that he would have villas built for them at Trencianske Teplice, complete with swimming pools. Supposedly they did not like that idea, either, because their wives would have nowhere to shop. But, according to the prime minister, even here a solution existed. The wives would have been able to fly by helicopter to Vienna for shopping once a week at government expense. "They did not take it," Vladimir Meciar says,

adding that it was not a "seriously meant offer" on the part of the GM. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: SNS Official Details Amending of Coalition Treaty

AU1607095696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by Monika Martinkovicova: "According to Marian Anel, a Supplement to the Coalition Treaty Must Not Prevent the Partners From Expressing a Different View"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Marian Anel (Slovak National Party [SNS]), the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] deputy chairman, and Ivan Simko, an NRSR deputy and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] deputy chairman, met in Saturday's [13 July] discussion program on Radio Twist to complete, with the assistance of moderator Anna Vargova, their discussion on the coalition crisis prior and during the 16th NRSR meeting.

Following the initial exchange of views, the question was asked, in conjunction with the concurrent meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Republican Presidium, which was to discuss, among other issues, a supplement to the coalition treaty to set boundaries for members of the coalition, what boundaries and limits would be acceptable for the SNS. Anel conceded that the coalition treaty was formulated in very general terms, did not specify the course of action to be taken in the event of a possible coalition crisis, and it was necessary to settle this issue. "There must be some instruments to determine when and under what circumstances it is possible to leave the coalition," Anel said. However, on the other hand, it is not permissible to limit a political entity in "what it may or may not say. In that case there could only exist one large state party, as in the past, and that would be all. We simply cannot be limited in where we may and may not go.

"A situation could arise when we will again have a somewhat different opinion from our coalition partner—it need not be the HZDS; it could also be the Association of Workers of Slovakia—and we must be able to express this opinion. We simply cannot be limited in this by some paper." Asked under what circumstances the coalition treaty would be unacceptable to the SNS, whether it would be rendered unacceptable if the supplement were such that it would strive to limit the SNS, Anel replied: "Look, dear lady, you know me well and you know Messrs. Slota and Moric. You know that we will simply not let ourselves be limited. We have such explosive temperaments that we simply would not tolerate it. But that supplement will really be necessary if the coalition is to function in the way that it should."

Hungary: Compensation Claims Submitted for Damage by IFOR Troops

LD1507151396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The number of people submitting compensation claims for damage caused by IFOR [Implementation Force] troops based in Hungary is higher than expected. More than 300 claims will have to be assessed in Somogy County alone. The aggrieved submitted claims with a total value of over 65 million forints [Ft]. The majority of claims are related to damage caused to buildings by IFOR transportation vehicles and the majority were submitted in Taszar.

The largest claim, valued at Ft12 million, was submitted by the flying club in Kaposujlak, since it could not use the Kaposujlak airport because of the presence of IFOR's helicopters.

A total of 75 percent of the compensation will be paid by the United States and the rest by the Hungarian Government.

Hungary: Kovacs Warns Diplomats of Contacts With Nationals

LD1507150596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs called for keeping relations with Hungarian organizations abroad free of party political issues and ideology. Addressing a meeting held in Budapest for Hungary's ambassadors, Kovacs warned the Hungarian diplomats to avoid even the appearance of intervention in countries where Hungarians also live.

The foreign minister considers as unjustified the outrage expressed by neighboring countries because of the statement issued at a meeting held by Hungarians living in Hungary and by those living abroad. Kovacs said that the document included autonomy efforts in line with European practice.

Hungary: Official Views Slovak, Romanian Anti-Hungarian Moves

LD1507205096 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Slovak National Party has recently suggested banning the Hungarian parties of Slovakia. In Romania, Gheorghe Funar [Cluj mayor and leader of the Romanian National Unity Party] asked President Ilescu to suspend the parliamentary immunity of the Hungarian deputies of Bucharest on the grounds of repeated violation of the law. In connection with such worrying news, we interviewed Laszlo Labody, titular

state secretary, head of the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Borders.

[Begin Labody recording] In my opinion, one has to look for the reasons behind these reactions, first of all, in the Slovak and Romanian internal and foreign political endeavors. As to what the Hungarian government can do in these circumstances, well, we must not be hasty, since a war of words is being waged in Slovakia and there is not much more happening in Romania either for the time being. When the purpose of this war of words becomes clear, whether it is some sort of campaign to create an atmosphere against Hungary and Hungarian policy, or maybe more, in the light of developments we will decide what to do. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Hungary: Integration Viewed in Light of Minority Policies

96CH0130A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 31 May 96 p 11

[Article by Laszlo M. Lengyel: "Minority Affairs; Hungarian-Hungarian Conflicts; The One-Way Streets of Dilemmas; Neighborhood Tensions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It would be a real tragedy for Hungarians in Romania if Hungary became a member of (West) European integration organizations before its neighbor, Romania." Later on we will examine whether Laszlo Tokes' statement is true, whether it was made at a politically suitable time and in a politically suitable form, and whether, in our view, it was harmful or helpful. For openers let us say this: With his outspoken style, the Hungarian Reformed Church bishop and politician of Romania has already caused an actual revolution, political disputes, and unpleasant, hard to repair damages. He has once again made a statement that cannot be overlooked from the standpoint of Hungarian minority policies.

Personal Disputes, Conflicting Principles

At the same time, did he make one statement providing grounds for the reexamination of minority policies, and another statement according to which the major dilemmas, as they appear today, might be regarded as Hungarian-Hungarian conflicts? We must realize that regardless of the number of avenues we open to explore conflicts, all avenues will be one-way streets. These avenues cannot be opened for two-way traffic in order to find a solution, one of the sides must always yield, and the one who yields would have to agree to a compromise by receiving compensation through another street, in which traffic proceeds in the direction of his interests. This situation is not helped by but explained by the fact that the situation is caused not by Hungarian-Hungarian

problems, but can be traced to the fact that the political nation coexists with the given minority, and the state of that political nation is simply incapable of resolving the basic conflict under its own roof, inside its borders, within the framework of the present political system and democratic institutions.

Among Hungarian-Hungarian problems, the unfortunate disputes between or within Hungarian minority organizations operating beyond the borders are the most banal. From this point of view, the situation is most tense in the Vojvodina region of Serbia (the only reason we do not mention the Hungarian organizations of Croatia in the same breath is that the size of their membership and the importance of their organizations cannot be compared with those of Vojvodina); this situation is also characteristic in Subcarpathia [Ukraine's Transcarpathian region], and sometimes also manifests itself with a warning force among Hungarians in Transylvania. Two organizations face each other in Vojvodina: the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDK) [DZVM in Serbian], and the Hungarian Federation of Vojvodina [VMSZ in Hungarian; MFV in Serbian], (an organization that originally seceded from the VMDK, then successfully organized itself into an independent political force). The fundamental conflicts are motivated by personal matters that originally evolved from judgments concerning VMDK's management and politics. They tried to conceptualize the dispute by bringing three issues to the forefront. One of these is the relationship with the Yugoslav and Serbian organs of power, the state power structures, and the Serbian political parties; the second issue, which peaked in the guise of the autonomy idea, centers around perceived conflicts of interests between areas where the Hungarian population is in the majority within the province, and areas where Hungarians live scattered about; the third issue pertains to the way the Hungarian minority should relate to Hungarian Government circles, and to the minority policies of the Hungarian Government.

Recently, there also appeared to be a dispute within the VMDK concerning management techniques and personalities. This, too, is an important indication, especially regarding the fact that with its given operating circumstances, and because of its present lack of internal democracy, the organization is virtually incapable of implementing personnel changes that are potentially necessary today—recalling or confirming leaders—in its decisionmaking bodies without publicizing these disputes. Critics and the passive subjects of criticism may be equally certain: It is not easy to remove them from their present positions. This situation cannot be excused by the fact that the fundamental formula we

see in Hungarian organizations reflects the operational shortcomings of all Serbian democracy.

Would Tokes Slow Down?

The other big issue pertains to the relationship between Hungarian minorities beyond the borders and Hungary's minority policy, or actually, Hungarian political leadership and the Hungarian state. From among Hungarian leaders beyond the borders who most firmly criticize Budapest, one must mention, by all means, the names of Miklos Duray, Andras Agoston, and Laszlo Tokes. In evaluating their political discourse, we must not disregard the fact that these leaders sense the deteriorating situation of the Hungarian minorities, the relative indifference manifested by the international community, and the increasing aggressiveness of certain groups in the majority nations. Thus they urge Budapest to pursue more effective policies. Meanwhile, their truth also appears to be supported by the fact that they actually feel the impact of reality on their own skins.

At this point we could begin the specific examination of Tokes's fears. Before doing so, however, we should note that from the standpoint of a relatively successful, professionally well-managed [Hungarian parliamentary] opposition which, in conjunction with integration, attacks an ascending Hungarian foreign policy, neighborhood and minority policies can be viewed in many ways, and in their many aspects offer themselves as virtually the only issue of contention.

No one would argue with Tokes if he were to say that the scrupulous balance of the three priorities of Hungarian foreign policy cannot be maintained at all times. In fact, the prospects of Hungarian integration today are better than the chances of settling the situation of Hungarians beyond the borders, especially as concerns Romania and to a certain extent Slovakia. It is also true that Hungary's entry (into either NATO or the EU), with the temporary absence of Romania in these organizations would increase the effectiveness of the diplomatic means of neighborhood policy available to Hungary but would not provide a defensive power status to Budapest, and one cannot disregard the fact that not only the South Tyrolian model functions within a united Europe, but also the French nation state concept.

One statement that could make Tokes's statement true is missing: Today's Hungarian policies cannot be blamed if Romania does not fall within the initial area of [EU, NATO] expansion, and however painful the minority issue may be, we have no reason to artificially retard the process. Moreover, we should expressly avoid a situation in which Romania could veto the outcome of Hungarian integration efforts in conjunction with a need

to liquidate tensions in the neighborhood. A situation like that could be more tragic than the difficulties awaiting the minorities.

Romanian foreign minister Tinca predicts a new arms race in the region if Romania were to stay outside. This, too, is based on a one-sided probability, notably if Hungary had to attend NATO's needs primarily, while Romania would indeed give priority to its own internal responsive measures. Unfortunately, these include pressure exerted on minorities, but only temporarily—in the short term—unless Romania once and for all surrenders its endeavor to integrate [with the West]. Accordingly, the main question is this: Could the effectiveness of the means flowing from [EU, NATO] membership somewhat offset the negative effects of Romanian disappointment?

Money and Tolerance

If, on the other hand, Romania permanently turns its back to the West, the fate of Slovakia remains questionable. An integrated Slovakia could no longer

be an element of a new alliance organized by Moscow, lining up Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria alongside Russia—an alliance that could become truly effective and viable only with the conversion of Ukraine, which is recalcitrant today from the Russian standpoint, and with Moldova joining. It is difficult, however, to see so far ahead because there is an abundance of uncertainty.

One would be able to assess with much more certainty the kind of economic magnet a Hungary on its way to membership, with harnessed inflation, a stable society, and on the path of economic development, might be. It would be very difficult to neutralize such a Hungary with any kind of Romanian nationalist policies.

The fate of minorities primarily depends on whether, 10 to 20 years from now, it will be economical for members of this minority to preserve their identity and develop their culture and education, and whether this has enough merit in the eyes of a majority nation, again in terms of money, to make it worthwhile to tolerate a development of this kind.

B-H: Izetbegovic Thanks Clinton for Support

LD1507194196 Sarajevo BH PRESS
in Serbo-Croatian 1750 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Jul (BH PRESS)—Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received John Menzies, the U.S. ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and handed him a letter for U.S. President Bill Clinton.

This letter is a reply to Clinton's letter to Izetbegovic of 21 June 1996.

In his reply President Izetbegovic thanks the U.S. President for his support in the efforts to establish the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

As is known, immediately after the passing of the federation's defense law on 9 July 1996, the U.S. President ordered the start-up of the "Train and Equip" program.

"I would like to praise your colleagues and especially Envoy Pardew for resolving exceptionally important questions for the further development of the federation and the security of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their assistance will continue to be welcome and necessary," Izetbegovic's letter to Clinton says.

The letter goes on to say that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is fully cooperating with the Hague tribunal and that it will continue to do so, and the Bosnian and U.S. sides will also closely cooperate on all issues relating to the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

"I thank you for everything you are doing for Bosnia-Herzegovina and I would like once again to assure you of our determination to fully implement all the provisions of the Dayton agreement in the interest of peace in this part of the world," the letter concludes.

B-H: Sacirbegovic To Propose Election Boycott Over Karadzic

LD1507211896 Sarajevo BH PRESS
in Serbo-Croatian 1627 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 15 Jul (BH PRESS)—Muhamed Sacirbegovic, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations, said in Sarajevo today that he will propose that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and all pro-Bosnian political parties boycott the September elections unless the international community removes the prime war crimes suspect, Radovan Karadzic, from the political arena.

Speaking at a news conference today, he corroborated his proposal by saying that all signatories to the Dayton agreement, as well as international mediators, are in

agreement that war criminals should be removed from public office, and that they should be tried before the Hague tribunal.

"Therefore, the legitimate Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities must demand that the international community fulfill its share of responsibilities stemming from the Dayton agreement," he said.

Sacirbegovic sees the sudden visit by U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade and Sarajevo as a clear sign that the implementation of the Dayton agreement has reached a critical phase.

He is hopeful that Richard Holbrooke will manage to persuade the authorities in Belgrade, and through them also the authorities in Pale, to finally embrace the consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement. Sacirbegovic is of the opinion that Holbrooke again has "mechanisms" to encourage Milosevic to be cooperative.

"The international community cannot have any further demands from the legitimate authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the Bosnian side has fulfilled all its obligations," he added. [passage omitted]

B-H: Izetbegovic, Scalfaro View Ties, Hague Tribunal's Work

AU1107160396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jul 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on news conference by Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro and Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with unidentified reporters in Sarajevo on 11 July; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second visit by Italian President Scalfaro, who was in Sarajevo for the first time in early February, began with talks with President Izetbegovic, who at the subsequent news conference expressed satisfaction with the opportunity to meet with the president of a country that proved itself to be a great friend of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war.

[Izetbegovic] "This can be seen from Italy's strong political support for our struggle for freedom and independence, and for our efforts to create a multinational, multicultural community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That country's friendship can also be seen in the humanitarian aid it provided us during the war, when our country was most in need."

Izetbegovic announced that, as part of further cooperation, a group of Italian engineers will assist in the reconstruction of railroads between Doboj and Tuzla and Zvornik and Tuzla, as well as in mine-clearing operations in that region.

[Izetbegovic] "There is an interesting idea to organize a slalom race for peace on Mt. Bjelasnica in December. This race, which would not be a real competition but just an exhibition, would be followed by a large concert."

The Italian president also emphasized the friendly relationship between Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he also recalled one of the greatest tragedies in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war—the tragedy of Srebrenica.

[Scalfaro, in Italian with passage-by-passage translation into Serbo-Croatian] "I wanted to convey my thoughts and memory of the victims of a horrible, inhuman tragedy that cannot be described by words and which represents a crime by all means and in any sense."

Both presidents were asked about the international arrest warrant expected to be issued today against Karadzic and Mladic. Izetbegovic said the following:

[Izetbegovic] "We are impatiently awaiting the decision of the Hague tribunal, hoping, of course, that it will yield practical results, that is, that the decision will not remain a dead letter, because the presence of war criminals on the political stage in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a direct violation of the Dayton agreement. Indeed, it acts as a brake upon the implementation of the peace process, and therefore the decision to be made today is very important."

President Scalfaro had this to say:

[Scalfaro, in Italian with passage by passage translation into Serbo-Croatian] "[Word indistinct] we wanted that tribunal. I have to say that I personally demanded that the tribunal be established sooner. I believe it would be useless to have the tribunal without justice."

Today Italian President Scalfaro will also visit Italian soldiers on a mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Muratovic Interviewed on Refugees, Economy
AU1407154896 Hanau NOVA BOSNA
in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jul 96 pp 10-11

[Interview with Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mehmed Buhic, place and date not given: "First We Must Create the Preconditions, and Only Then Bring Back the Refugees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the instructive meeting of SDA (Party of Democratic Action) activists and people in charge of the organization and implementation of the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we took the opportunity to ask Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a few questions that we believed would be of interest to our readers and to all our citizens who are staying outside of the country

for whatever reason. He took the time to answer these questions especially for NOVA BOSNA:

[Buhic] The most interesting thing by far would to hear some answers to questions concerning the refugees and exiled people. In that context, there is information that the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has demanded too many concessions from Germany for bringing the refugees back to the country. How would you comment on that?

[Muratovic] I have read some articles on that subject. I believe that there have been some very incorrect articles. Someone concluded, from another, different request of mine, that I had asked for 4 billion German marks [DM]. That is not true, but it is true that we have asked and will continue to ask that every country should help the return of refugees who are staying on its territory.

We have calculated that between DM10-12,000 would be needed for the members of refugee families, for us to ensure minimum conditions for their living upon return. We will still insist on that, because that is much less than the host countries will spend on our refugees in the course of this year alone.

If we were given that amount we could have brought back at least 150,000 of our people from Germany this year, as with that amount we could repair their destroyed houses and start some of the production.

[Buhic] What is the attitude of the Federal Government of Germany?

[Muratovic] Unfortunately we do not negotiate with the federal government about that issue. The refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina are sustained by the states, i.e., by the laender, so that the federal government cannot do anything without the compliance of those laender. And what is worse, the laender do not all think the same. Therefore we have now started making separate contracts. One of these will soon be concluded regarding the Bihac region, so I hope that by the fall we will have brought at least 20,000 refugees to that region. We intend to propose to the European Union that it should also support the refugees and help them financially, and we expect to get full understanding from them. What I am sure of is that we will not agree to bring the refugees back to places where there are no conditions for that.

Frequent Contacts With Germans

[Buhic] Does that mean that the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least a large number of people, will not be returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina this year?

[Muratovic] I am sure that there will no massive return. Certain projects will be made for everything, as we

do with our people from Turkey, who arrive at certain intervals and in certain numbers. I do not expect that by the end of this year there will be any massive returns from Germany. But on the other hand I am certain that that will start next spring. And that number will amount to one-third of the people accommodated there.

[Buhic] Do you intend to meet with the competent people from Germany and contact them in the next few days?

[Muratovic] We have contacts very often and on all levels. In that way we constantly bring our positions closer to each other, as we did some 10 days ago. It would also have been that way today as well, if it were not Sunday. [as published]

[Buhic] What did you talk about a few days ago, on the level of the ministers of the two countries?

[Muratovic] We talked about a concrete project for return, on which we have still made no definite agreement. But as you can see, they always prolong the stay for our refugees, and we are certain that they will get tired of that, and that the German people will be generous when it comes to the return of refugees, just as they were when they received them.

[Buhic] There are great problems when it comes to the refugees from the so-called Serb entity. They are seen as the second-class citizens, people who cannot go back to their homeland, particularly those with permanent residence permits. Tell us something about that.

[Muratovic] There are still no organized returns to the territory of the Serb entity, and there will not be any soon. We want those people to return close to their home towns, such as for example those from Prijedor going to Sanaki Most, or those from Bosanski Novi to Luscii Palanka, and there prepare to go to their hometowns.

[Buhic] And where should they stay in those places?

[Muratovic] Of course they should go there only if they have solid accommodations in a house or apartment.

[Buhic] The Croatian authorities are creating big problems for us.

[Muratovic] Beginning 11 July they will create no more problems, because on that day we will meet in Dubrovnik and sign an additional agreement, so there will be no problems any longer.

[Buhic] To whom does that refer specifically?

[Muratovic] To the citizens of our state who are in the territory under the Serb regime.

Unfavorable Agreement With Croatia

[Buhic] But we have information that the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has signed an agreement on preventing our citizens from the territory of the so-called Serb entity from passing through the territory of Croatia. If that is true, why has it been done?

[Muratovic] That is exactly what the agreement on a "no-visa regime" sounds like. Only the citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina can travel without visas. They have the right to travel through Croatia an unlimited number of times and to stay in it for up to three months after they have entered the country once.

That is Croatia's right, because like other countries it can determine whom it wants to let into the country and whom it does not. We also agreed to that contract, but when we saw what sort of problems that had created we made an additional agreement with Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Croatia, according to which all refugees have the right to pass through without any problems and without announcements....

[Buhic] However, the Croats have started complicating things again?!

[Muratovic] Yes, that is right. Now we have made another agreement according to which all those who have a residence visa for Germany, on any basis, have the right to pass through Croatia, regardless of which entity they come from, and that an unlimited number of times, but with a limited stay of 48 hours. We will sign that in Dubrovnik, as I said, on 11 July. I am sure that everything will be all right, and that we will thus solve that problem.

[Buhic] We have heard that Fikret Abdic has been nominated for state president. Is that true, and can you comment?

[Muratovic] That is true. His party has been registered for the elections, and he has been nominated for the post of the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is my evaluation that the nomination will be accepted, because he has been registered by Croats, just like the party he leads. That was done on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the city of Mostar. It is well known that he has the support of Croatia, and I believe you all know well why that country has been doing that.

We know that he is politically a dead man, but we should not try to hide from the fact that he could cause us certain problems in Bosanska Krajina, particularly in Velika Kladusa. The fact that we are being made fools of by his appearance, in the first place by neighboring Croatia, and also by the international community, that is

a separate question. But that shows us well with whom we are dealing.

Few Diplomatic and Consular Offices

[Buhic] Has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs escaped control, and why are there few members of the SDA in diplomatic and consular offices?

[Muratovic] I can tell you that when I was appointed prime minister, I promised that I would make changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I have made a completely new organization. We have planned the closure of some embassies. In Vienna we have three embassies and we are now making only one. We will bring back a large number of people. We have already recalled a large number of them. At first we handed in over 80 recalls. Now we will send in another 80, and as many in the fall, which exceeds half of the people employed in the diplomatic and consular offices together. So we will make huge changes, and that is not because all of them are not good, but because during the war they have spent quite some time in those posts abroad. The moves that I am now making in that respect are made in all countries.

I have to say that we have met with great resistance. I am not sure that many of these people will come back to the country, but I am sure that they will not work in their present positions when their time is over. We have to make changes in the diplomatic and consular offices for people here to trust us. You will also see changes in the election lists. We do not discard anybody, but the time of changes is unavoidable. I have to admit that we very much care about the diaspora and about its opinion and behavior.

Iranian Economic Help

[Buhic] After everything that has lately happened between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, and the United States, what are the relations between our state and the friendly Iran now like?

[Muratovic] Iran is a country and a nation that helped us a lot during the war. But in respecting the Dayton agreement we have stopped relations of military aid with that country, while at the same time continuing cooperation on the economic plane and in the cultural field. Our orientation is to have good relations with both the United States and Iran, just like with all other countries. In our policy we rely on the United States, the European Union, and the Islamic world.

[Buhic] What did the Iranians say to all that?

[Muratovic] They said that they wanted to help Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they would accept every solution

our state chose, because their goal was to help the Bosniak Muslims to survive. They have no reserves toward us, and will do whatever is of use to us.

[Buhic] What do you, as the first man in our government, say to that?

[Muratovic] We will not take part in clearing up relations between the United States and Iran. We will strictly obey the Dayton agreement. One of our priority goals is to implement the "Train and Equip" program, because in that way we will get huge amounts of equipment and the training of the army, with which we will establish a balance of military power. As for Iran, we will continue to cooperate with it as a country that helped us a lot in the war.

[Buhic] What is the economic situation in the country like?

[Muratovic] The situation is different from that during the war. However, we are now getting help in the reconstruction of the infrastructure, and less in the reactivation of the economy. That is a special game that we have to understand. We expect to start up the economy to the maximum, as much as possible, by next year, and that we will initiate a new wave of founding firms with the help of all kinds of credit from all those who can give us certain means. All that has the objective of the faster return of our people to the country and to their normal life and work.

B-H: Article Questions Efficacy of Adopted Defense Law

AU1407175796 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jul 96 p 25

[Article by Snjezana Pavic: "United Army of Two Components"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am glad to say that the Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted the new defense law this afternoon. Bosnian President Izetbegovic and federal President Zubak have made compromises in many important issues in order to make the defense law real," President Clinton stated, after the long and uncertain haggling between Croats and Muslims about the federal defense law ended on Tuesday [9 July] afternoon. Clinton was equally glad to announce the beginning of the "Train and Equip" program—under U.S. leadership—for the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the details of his announcement were helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, ammunition, and other military equipment in which the United States has invested \$100 million, besides the \$140 million that "friendly

countries" have given for the training of the federal armed forces.

Judging by the fact that the law was adopted according to the urgent procedure, in less than half an hour, with only three votes against, we might say that Izetbegovic and Zubak have really achieved the unbelievable: A law that would function and satisfy both sides. However, the most important disputed issue—civilian command over the army, or supreme command—has remained unsolved, or rather solved in a very Solomonic way: The army will be under the command of the president of the presidency (Izetbegovic) in the name of the Muslims, and the federal president (Zubak) in the name of the Croats. However, that will be valid only in the transitional period, before the elections. After the elections, the haggling will begin again.

The Essential Problem: Who Is in Command?

The essential problem is that the Muslims will not agree that the federal leaders command the army, but demand the command of the leadership of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hasan Cengic, deputy federal defense minister, emphasized that only those who embody the sovereignty of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and have international subjectivity—and the entities do not satisfy those criteria—might be given civilian command over the army. That is why the Croat side has accused the Muslims of trying to turn a federal law into a republic law.

Moreover, the Croat side has pointed out that it is nonsense that the federal president and vice president should be excluded from the command of the federal armed forces. According to the Dayton agreement, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have no army. The U.S. idea of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the sovereignty should be guarded by the federal and Mladic's armed forces, which means that the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not command the country's defense. The Muslims do not want to accept that, and they are trying—through the defense law—to revise those regulations of the Dayton agreement that they find disastrous. They see the Federal Army as a nucleus of the future Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina that would integrate the third "component," the army of the Serb entity.

One Army or Two Components?

That is not the only disputed issue in the (finally adopted) law. Essentially, the law creates one Federal Army under one command, integrating both the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Croats would prefer having two armies so they can keep the HVO, while Muslims want one army. They

want it right away, but they accepted the three-year term suggested by the United States.

The arrangement on full integration within three years, with one defense ministry and collective command structure, was solemnly signed in the presence of Clinton and Christopher in May, in the session of the Forum on the Federation in Washington. However, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak said afterwards, very resolutely, that "the HVO cannot be disputed, not even in theory." That means not even in the imposed three-year term. After the final adoption of the law, Federal Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic said that there were different interpretations of the union of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army: The Croatian side preferred the idea of one army consisting of two components, with a joint ministry, logistics, and command, plus the mechanism that would prevent the army from "being turned into the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and being used against Croats." On the other hand, Soljic's deputy Hasan Cengic stressed that the attitude of the Muslim side was that neither federal defense nor the united army can exist without full integration.

The most controversial part of the issue of united or two-component army is whether recruits will be given choice of the formation in which they will serve. Croats are insistent on having that choice, while the Muslims are resolutely refusing. Allegedly, a consensus on that was reached, but Cengic warned that the law might have two different interpretations. In his words, the Croat side "has made incorrect translations of the English original document," and their interpretation is that both recruits and reservists have the right to choose the military component in which they will serve. Muslims, on the other hand, claim that such a right would make a global precedent. Still, they like the regulation that mentions personal preference of recruits and reservists, because—in their interpretation—it only refers to expressing preferences, while the final decision will be taken by the defense minister and his deputy, as defined by the law.

Washington Has Had Enough

To make a long story short, everyone was pleased that the law was finally adopted, especially the United States. For two months after the document had been signed in Washington no progress was made, and the United States had really had enough—as evident in the fact that U.S. Defense Minister Perry also came to Bosnia-Herzegovina last weekend. CIA head John Deutch came on the same weekend, unannounced, and—as a "coincidence"—THE WASHINGTON POST wrote that several hundred soldiers from Islamic countries

were still in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, stubborn Croats were (also) pressured with the "Train and Equip" program, intended to help the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which is far weaker than the HVO. Although the program was not to be started before the adoption of the defense law, and that stipulation was constantly highlighted, the news was published—while the Croats in Washington even refused the three-year period of integration—that 200 Muslim soldiers had gone to Ankara for training "with arms that the Sarajevo government would soon receive."

The fear that the federal partner might be armed without their control made the Croat negotiators more cooperative. As Vladimir Soljic said yesterday [10 July], "immense funds and equipment that will arrive will change the situation in the field. It is in our best interest that the changes do not impair our position."

Just a Phase in the Turbulent Federal Relations

Will the Federation eventually have the united army that the United States has dreamed of? "The Americans have viewpoints that cannot be applied in our regions. They cannot seem to understand that the war here happened because of more than one nation," Soljic noticed yesterday. The Muslims like the U.S. idea, because they want to get rid of the HVO. Soljic's associate Cengic commented: "The truth is that the Croat separationist policy will not exist without the HVO. To prolong the life of the HVO is to prolong the existence of the idea of division of the Federation."

Despite Clinton's estimations that the application of the recently adopted defense law will "improve security situation for everyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina and contribute to the lasting peace in the region after the withdrawal of the IFOR [Implementation Force]," the law is more likely to be just a phase in the dynamic federal relations. The Resolution on the lifting of the embargo is to become valid in a week, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will receive—besides the weapons given by the United States—"substantial funds" that "friendly countries" have deposited for them. The Croat media are accusing the Muslims—on the grounds of "confidential information"—of "rapid militarization" of western Bosnia, while the sister media (Muslim) reveal that "new instructors, weapons, and equipment that the HVO has never had before" have come to central Bosnia (another possible site of crisis or hostilities). Those "must have been imported via the territory held by 'the natural allies of Croats'—the chetniks."

B-H: Casado To Leave Mostar Administrator Post 22 Jul

LD1507160696 Madrid RNE International in Spanish
1500 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Spaniard Ricardo Perez Casado, European Union [EU] administrator of the city of Mostar, capital of Herzegovina, will leave this post on 22 July, the date on which his mandate ends, and will be replaced by his deputy, the Briton Martin Garrod.

Today, Monday, Perez Casado informed the EU Council of Foreign Ministers of his decision not to continue in the post as the 15 [EU member states] wished, and proposed as EU special envoy his assistant, Sir Martin Garrod, who from 22 July onward will be responsible for supervising the tasks still to be completed.

The ministers accepted Perez Casado's decision, and agreed Garrod should be the person to take on the mission of special envoy when the EU representation in Mostar changes status and is reduced to a more technical than political level. The current Mostar administrator explained that his decision not to remain there is due to the fact that the mission for which he was sent there is over. His successor, Martin Garrod, a British army lieutenant general on leave, said he will deal with matters relating to the management and support of the new local Mostar administration, which is due to be established after the elections.

B-H: Biographical Details of New EU Mostar Administrator

AU1507174696 Paris AFP in English
1735 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 15 (AFP)—Sir Martin Garrod, named Monday as the new head of the EU administration in Mostar, is a former commando who is currently EU chief of staff in this southern city.

Garrod, 60, came to Mostar in June 1994 as a key part of what he called the "advance party," planning where and how the EU would carry out its mission of trying to reunite a city divided between Croats and Moslems.

On Friday, he announced the results of Mostar's June 30 elections after the city electoral commission refused to do so, saying the public "had a right to know."

White-haired and slim, the career soldier gives the impression of having a "no-nonsense" approach.

Often deputising for current EU administrator Ricardo Perez Casado, who leaves on July 22, Garrod knows the main players and the background to the situation.

He can draw on his experiences in Northern Ireland, a community similarly riven by division, where he was mentioned in despatches in Belfast in 1973.

He was involved in the British army's response to an IRA bombing of a Royal Marine school of music at Deal, southeast England, which killed 11 people.

Garrod was born in 1935 in Darjeeling, India, and went to Sherbourne, a top fee-paying school in England, and army college.

During a career in the Royal Marines, during which he rose to be Commandant General, he served in Cyprus and Borneo. He also led a commando brigade in the late 1970s and coordinated support for them during the Falklands war in 1982.

He was decorated with the Order of the British Empire in 1979 and knighted in 1987.

In 1991, at the age of 55, he was presented with an award for coming to the assistance of a plain-clothes policeman on the London Underground.

Garrod is married with two daughters.

B-H: Parties Comment on Schedule for Elections, Srebrenica

AU1507143496

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT on 15 July carries in its regular 32-minute newscast three reports on news conferences by the Liberal Party (LB), the Liberal Bosniak Organization (LBO), and the Bosnian Party (BS).

The studio announcer says that "the postponement of the official start of the election campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina until 19 July is a major political issue, as it concerns the participation of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in the September elections, Trajo Krsmanovic, member of the LB Executive Committee, said at this party's regular news conference in Sarajevo. He added that the next few days will be crucial for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the international community is facing the decision on whether the elections will be held and what they will be like." The studio announcer says that "Krsmanovic commented on the letter sent by Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the Provisional Election Commission with the demand that the local elections be postponed, saying that this would block the peace process."

As for the LBO, this party believes that "the elections in Mostar have shown that the policy for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina and united Mostar has won." LBO Deputy

Chairman Salih Foco said at today's news conference that this party has been consistent and clear in its policy from the very start. It has never fought to gain power but for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Speaking about the Srebrenica tragedy and the responsibility of the international community and the Bosnia-Herzegovina political structures, Foco said that the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also responsible for the great many Srebrenica deaths."

The BS says that it asked, "over two months ago, of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] that the cantonal and municipal elections be held after the state and entity ones. The party believes that, in this way, the optimum conditions would be created for the establishment of political structures that would contribute to positive, democratic, and reintegrative processes. The postponement of the cantonal and municipal elections would be in the interests of the refugees and displaced people."

B-H: UN Police Receive More Serb Threats

*AU1607114396 Paris AFP in English
1127 GMT 16 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 16 (AFP)—UN police operating in Serb-held Bosnia have received further threats of retaliation should arrests be made of indicted Bosnian Serb leaders, officials said Tuesday.

A spokesman for the UN police force in Bosnia (IPTF) [International Police Task Force] said Serb officials in northern Bosnia had threatened to take IPTF members hostage if Radovan Karadzic or General Ratko Mladic were arrested.

The two Serb leaders have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for war crimes during the Bosnian conflict.

International arrests warrants issued last week for the pair has heightened fears among the Serb leadership that Mladic and Karadzic could be snatched by NATO peacekeepers.

IPTF spokesman Alexander Ivanko said he was "extremely concerned about these reports. We hope that the information we are receiving at the local level is only that, a local initiative." The remarks were also possibly broadcast on local radio, Ivanko added.

This is the second such threat from the Serb authorities in under a week. Also last week, a UN vehicle was blown up with 1.5 kilogrammes (three pounds) of explosives Ivanko said.

Written and verbal assurances have been given to the IPTF commissioner by the Bosnian Serb interior minister that UN police will be safe, Ivanko said.

"We are buying his view for the moment. We hope that the (Bosnian Serb authorities) will do what they have promised to do," he said.

A spokesman for NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia, Lieutenant Colonel Max Marriner said there had been no change to the peacekeepers' activities.

"The patrolling posture that we have is a regular patrolling pattern. It's clearly unnerving a lot of the bad boys out there...but there is no change in our policy," he said.

NATO's peacekeeping force has no mandate to hunt down indicted war criminals but has said it will arrest war crimes suspects if it comes across them in the course of normal duty.

B-H: Klickovic Cites Details of Belgrade Talks

AU1207130396 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI 28-30 Jun 96 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Momcilo Joksimovic; place and date not given: "The Last Step Toward Creating a State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the news is out, particularly in the Yugoslav public, that Dr. Radovan Karadzic has allegedly "resigned" as president of the Serb Republic, Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, in an interview for GLAS SRPSKI, talks about the current situation in the Serb Republic.

"The news about the talks between Belgrade and the Serb Republic has leaked out, and everything that we had agreed to withhold from the public has become a generally known fact," Klickovic said. "I myself do not know how this happened, but it is probably yet another political intrigue linked to President Radovan Karadzic's participation in the upcoming elections. It is true that the negotiations were held. It is true that certain conditions were agreed, but it is also true that President Karadzic, whom we all know does not covet power and has always been pushed into accepting public office, clearly stated that his running in the elections would be determined by the new set of people in the party's Main Committee, which should be established on Saturday, after the assembly of the SDS [Serb Democratic Party] of the Serb Republic."

Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic also pointed out that only after all these activities have been conducted, will the members of the SDS Main Committee make a

decision regarding the elections and who will run in them.

"There is an assessment," Klickovic said, "that what the world fears is that President Karadzic will run in the elections. However, due to great pressure from the international community and pressure from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, probably because they themselves are under pressure, President Karadzic has said that he was prepared to sacrifice himself in a political sense, so that the Serb people in these parts could achieve their interests and goals. The news has leaked out that President Karadzic will not run in the elections that have been scheduled for 14 September. We also know that 4 July is the deadline for submitting complete lists of candidates for all major functions, both in the joint institutions as well as in the institutions of the Serb Republic.

In the mentioned document, formulated after the talks in Belgrade, there are eight or nine points that regulate certain relations, which are provisionally the conditions under which President Karadzic, if he is compelled or if he himself so decides, will not run in the elections, but only after these decisions have been approved by SDS Main Committee.

In these documents it is also clearly stated that in the above case, someone has to guarantee our party interests. I do not want to talk now about what our party interests are, because this document is still provisional. In other words, it is not a finished document, but a condition of President Karadzic in which he wanted to say that he is prepared to sacrifice everything for the Serb people, and that, in return for his sacrifice, the Serb people beyond the Drina River must be given certain guarantees. This primarily concerns security, territorial integrity, the reorganization of the army, and assistance in implementing all things of interest. These are precisely the key issues discussed in the latest Belgrade talks and this is the price that the president has agreed to pay, in return for firm guarantees, and then the president would return to the functions he held in 1990 and 1991. We know that there is strong party power, and, as chairman of the party, President Karadzic would again be a key figure."

Karadzic pointed out that even if he were formally to cease to be president of the Serb Republic, he would still remain the real leader, because the people of the Serb Republic had followed him into all this and the Serb Republic had followed him into all this and the Serb Republic will never be what it is without the name of President Karadzic.

"In an interview once long ago, I said that Karadzic was the soul of the Serb people, and we all know what it

means to have your soul torn out. Not this time, nor any other, will all these combinations prevent the SDS from running in the elections, and only victory is its aim. Everyone knows that if the SDS lost in the elections, we could look forward to certain integration into Bosnia-Herzegovina. This time, everyone must know that the Serb people will decide according to its conscience and that it will make the final step toward creating a state west of the Drina. The first condition would be a complete separation around Sarajevo, and the second condition, an SDS victory. The assessments of the West are clear: with Radovan Karadzic the SDS is unrivaled, without Radovan Karadzic the SDS could perhaps be shaken. My own assessment is that all this would be just one more counterproductive move for the West, which would only drive the Serb nation to even greater obstinacy, even among those who had not intended to vote for the SDS again. Stubbornness, as we know, is a characteristic of the Serb nation. This nation sees in Radovan Karadzic the personification of the Serb state which, whether one likes it or not, will be created on the territories west of the Drina."

[Joksimovic] Unfortunately, it is not only the West. In a certain way, threats have also emanated from Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic?

[Klickovic] Not only are there differences between the Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but, as you can see for yourself, there are differences between Serbia and Montenegro. It is evident that in Montenegro they do not know about the agreement reached in Belgrade, and that President Karadzic conditionally promised some things in order to save the Serb people beyond the Drina River. I have been reading in POLITIKA that Bulatovic has been sternly warning the leadership of the Serb Republic, although I do not why he is doing that when that is an entirely different state.

[Joksimovic] What is it specifically that Yugoslavia has to do? In other words, what are the conditions it has to resolve, in keeping with the conclusions reached in Belgrade?

[Klickovic] They are not difficult conditions. We are asking Yugoslavia to guarantee for the Serbs across the Drina security such as Croatia gives to the people of Herzeg-Bosnia. We also ask that there be no more yielding to the international community, because our dignity can stoop no lower. We also ask certain guarantees and mediation with the most important factors in the United States and Russia. That means that they should guarantee our integrity, security, borders, and that there will be no more war in this region. Nothing else had been asked of Yugoslavia.

[Joksimovic] The electric power crisis in Krajina and Banja Luka has recently reached its climax. To resolve this, the government has set aside special funding to complete the Derventa-Srbac long-distance power lines.

Deadline Will Be Met

[Klickovic] While I was still taking over the duties of prime minister, I was informed that work on the construction of the 110 kilovolt long-distance power line from Derventa to Srbac was coming along very slowly, and there were indications that part of the delay was caused by certain obstructions and even sabotage. I did not want to deal with that problems personally, so I simply called the contractors, the minister of industry and power, and we agreed that we had to provide for its completion. The final deadline is 15 July and no one has any right to prolong it, simply because all the necessary financial resources have been provided, as well as all essential materials. Making the long-distance power line system operational would mean improving the power situation in this entire area. The entire problem will not be solved, but it will be possible for us to provide new means of obtaining fuel to heat Banja Luka and Prijedor, which will mean that less electric power will be used in the coming winter.

[Joksimovic] What is the situation with the long-distance power line near Brcko?

[Klickovic] The vice president of the Serb Republic and five ministers are out there on the construction site, and on their behalf, and my own, I say we will no longer allow any further delays. The deadline for repairing the long-distance power line is 5 July, although I hope it will be finished before that. If this deadline is exceeded, not only will the ministers as well as the directors of "Elektrodisibucija" and "Elektroprivreda" be dismissed, but we will bring charges against a number of individuals. They all know that at eight o'clock in the morning on 15 July, none of them will be sitting where they are sitting now if the Derventa-Srbac long-distance power line does not begin working and the power-line poles near Brcko are not repaired. Electric power west of Brcko means survival and life in these parts. When I assumed my present job as prime minister, I was prepared to say that there would be no pensions, no welfare, no medical insurance, until the electricity issue for Krajina is resolved, because if there is no electric power, we will not need any of these other things.

[Joksimovic] Are the Croats supposed to begin delivering electrical power to us from the hydroelectric power plant on the Vrbas River, on the basis of previously established elements of reciprocity?

[Klickovic] I think that on Friday they will transfer around 15 megawatts of electric power from Jajce. According to my information, the initial trials have formally been completed and the long-distance power lines are capable of receiving such quantities. However, this can only partially cover the needs of our priority power consumers and somewhat improve the situation in the region beyond Prnjavor. Until now, these decreased sources had supplied electric power only as far as this town, but now the situation will be a little better in Doboj and Modrica as well. Here also we will only be able to cover our priority needs. I would like to point out that when economic cooperation is involved, objectively it is only possible to cooperate with the Croats.

[Joksimovic] The damage in Gacko has still not been cleared up?

[Klickovic] A detailed investigation was conducted and over the weekend I expect that those who have caused this breakdown or have in any way contributed to it will be indicted. In the case of the "Gacko" thermoelectric power plant, there have been deficiencies and failures within the working organization, but as far as sabotage or intention is concerned, this cannot be precisely determined. The fact is that for a full period of five years there have been no overhauls in Gacko, but we do know that experts who were supposed to take care of the power station are probably guilty of negligence and mistakes in handling the equipment. It is heartening to know that the extent of the damage is not as bad as it had seemed according to the initial information. One turbine has been damaged, and we have one just like it in Ugljevik. We will be able to take that turbine, replace the damaged one, and start operating the power station. This means that the damage will soon be repaired. We have a similar situation in "Ugljevik," where we will also not be able to go over the deadline set for the necessary repairs to be completed. The deadline is closely connected with the 15 July completion of the Derventa-Srbina long-distance power line. The government has also provided financial resources for the preparation of workers and storing of coal. The situation with adequate quantities of coal is critical both in "Ugljevik" and in "Gacko", and the government has therefore provided an additional 5 million German marks. No one will be able to find an excuse tomorrow if, for instance, there is no electricity because there is no coal, and that there is no coal because there was no money. This way, no one can find excuses for our not having electrical power. However, if in spite of everything there are still problems, then, I will not say that heads will roll but in any eventual problem of this kind, I can even use that expression. To leave almost

a million people from Ugljevik to here without electric power is tantamount to sabotage.

[Joksimovic] The government has passed a decision on launching new economic potentials in Banja Luka.

[Klickovic] It is true that we have decided to promote the start of a chemicals manufacturing plant within the Banja Luka-based "Incel" company. This factory produces chlorine necessary for the treatment of drinking water. Without this plant it is also impossible for Prijedor-based "Celpak" to start production. As far as "Celpak" is concerned, we have furnished everything except chlorine, and that is why we have provided a 200,000 German mark loan from the state budget to import the most essential repro-material. That is the most urgent requirement and our task is to make sure that these two systems begin to manufacture. At the same time, they themselves are initiating the start of production in forestry, transportation, sawmills....

[Box, p 13]

We Must Not Give In

Upon the prime minister's indication that Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, could withdraw from running in the elections, the editorial office of SRT [Serb Radio-Television] has been receiving very intense reactions from the citizens of the Serb Republic and Yugoslavia. Jovo Bojovic from Srbinje says:

"Radovan Karadzic has led us to freedom. If they should prevent him from running in the democratic elections, we will not vote in such elections, nor will we acknowledge the Dayton agreement, nor any other agreement."

Vasko Milojevic, from Banja Luka, says:

"What kind of elections are these if others design our election lists; what kind of freedom is this when they prohibit us from respecting our great 'leaders'?"

A group of workers from "Zenit" in Bijeljina, point out:

"Enough bowing. What else will they ask the Serbs to do; to forsake St. Sava, the Nemanjic's [medieval Serb dynasty], and perhaps even the Orthodox faith?"

There followed a multitude of calls from Sid, Sabac, Loznica, Belgrade, Beli Manastir, and a group of people from Vukovar remark:

"Dear brothers, do not let yourself suffer our fate. If you continue to yield, there will be no end to their pressures."

Messages have arrived from Trebinje, Bileca, Nevesinje, Gacko, Visegrad.

According to the latest information, the list of signatures on the petition supporting Dr. Radovan Karadzic is growing longer and longer.

B-H: SRNA Warns of Bloodshed if Mladic, Karadzic Arrested

LD1207230096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1626 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 Jul (SRNA)—Among the European countries only the United States and Germany are asking for the change in the mandate the Dayton agreement gave to IFOR [Implementation Force] and for it to become involved in the hazardous adventure of arresting the leaders of the Serb Republic. To be true, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel recommends that this operation be launched only after the elections in September.

An unidentified official of the German Foreign Ministry agrees with this—he believes that "the arrest will be counterproductive because it will paralyze the elections."

"We will not send our soldiers to arrest Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serb Army. The idea is to isolate them politically so that they lose their influence," this diplomat has said.

Unrestrained by diplomatic considerations and inspired by "the Serbophobia," the mediator in the Muslim-Croat Federation, Christian Schwartz-Schilling, thinks that the arrest operation should be launched before the elections; Herta Daeubler-Gmelin, the deputy leader of the Social Democratic Party, showed even more aggressive hatred for the Serbs, demanding euphorically that German troops be included in the chase to help IFOR.

They do not have to be careful about whether the arrest will be detrimental to Clinton's election campaign, because it is already old hat that such an operation will provoke general opposition in the Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as numerous rallies in support of Karadzic and General Mladic, where people have clearly said that "it will not happen without bloodshed," have shown.

Since both the Americans and the Europeans know this, Kinkel's more guarded statement is not surprising, and neither is a more explicit view of France and Great Britain which, REUTER has reported, claim that they will veto the proposal on the change of IFOR's mandate.

All this is surely timed for the elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in September. Let us recall, first there was some procrastination with whether the conditions for elections have been at all met, then Robert

Frowick added some "grease to the fire" by his statements that he will exclude the strongest Serb party from the elections, and now the things are brought to a climax with the arrest warrant and rumors that IFOR might take over the police work.

All this, naturally, cannot seriously influence the results of the elections, but the creators of the new world chaos believe that they will at least shake the Serb electorate, which is determined in advance to follow the policies of its leaders with whom it lived through one year in peace and four years of the defense war.

They believe that by maintaining this "cold and hot" atmosphere they can discourage at least a number of potential voters for the patriotic parties and "convert" them into proponents of the so-called unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will, pursuers of "the carrot and the stick" strategy believe, weaken the Serb national democratic bloc.

All these events could not of course take place without Antonio Casese, the supreme inquisitor of the Hague tribunal, who yesterday demanded from the UN Security Council that it "takes measures against the Serb Republic and the FRY for avoiding to cooperate with the Hague tribunal." This time Casese put this "hot potato" in the hands of the Security Council members, leaving them the possibility of finding some new, or already tested, pressure. But there is a miracle—for the first time, he admitted that he pushed too far.

At a news conference, Casese has said that "political decisions are not the domain of a legal institution such as the Hague tribunal." It will soon be known who has ordered him to say this, just as in September we will see all the pointlessness and futility of current brutal methods of blackmailing the freedom of the Serb people to express their will.

B-H: SSJ Leader Denies He Tried To Arrest Karadzic

LD1307203396 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's news conference held by the Bijeljina Municipal Committee of the Party of Serbian Unity [Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva—SSJ] was also attended by party chairman Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan. He used this opportunity to deny allegations that he had been wounded.

[Begin Arkan recording] I want to use the presence of Serb Republic Television reporters to deny allegations that I have been wounded. Similar allegations have been made on many occasions. I have received calls from people from all areas of the Serb Republic. I want to

tell them that I have not been wounded; that all sorts of allegations are being made up about how I was wounded while trying to arrest Serb President Radovan Karadzic.

I also want to deny these allegations; I have always supported our Serb leader Karadzic. I can only help him and defend him; how could I attack him or arrest him? I took part in the defense of the Serb Republic and this proves that I keep my promises and that I am loyal to the right people.

This is why these rumors come as a big blow to me. The rumors are being spread by a party; unfortunately it is a Serb party based in the Serb Republic. The Serb people are confused because they do not know what is happening. All I know is that President Karadzic and I have excellent relations and both of us are alive and well. [end recording]

Commenting on the upcoming elections in the Serb Republic, Arkan said:

[Begin Arkan recording] I have already said that the SSJ will not nominate its presidential candidate for the Serb Republic, because it is our belief that this will be an immoral gesture now that President Karadzic has been prevented from taking part in the elections. However, we did nominate our candidates for the presidency of the Serb Republic, and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] then determined the SSJ presidential and vice presidential candidates. I want to reiterate that it is immoral to nominate presidential candidates now that President Karadzic has been forcibly prevented from being a candidate.

I want the Serb Republic to become an oasis of peace, to enjoy a lasting peace. I want our dreams and the dreams of our ancestors to become true so that we can live in a single Serb state, all of us. That is what we strive for in the SSJ. I think the Serb Republic is facing a major struggle for reconstruction, an effort to improve the standard of living of the people of the Serb Republic. This can be done; the Serb Republic has great potential. It can use its own resources to build a new state that will be even better than the previous one. May God protect you and, believe me, I am very pleased that you have offered me this chance to deny all those allegations, those perfidious and unpleasant allegations. [end recording]

B-H: Serbs Demand Return to Original Border Demarcation Lines

LD1507181796 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The [Bosnian] Serb Republic is sticking to its standpoint that borders have to be returned to demarcation lines as they were on 21 November 1995 when the demarcation map with a scale of 1:600,000 was signed, Velibor Ostojic, deputy prime minister and head of the state commission for demarcation, told Serb TV last night. According to Ostojic, the original map was later transferred to a so-called operational map with a scale of 1:50,000, and 170 square km of territory were taken away from the Serb Republic in the process.

Ostojic said that no agreement on this issue has been reached in talks with the competent commission of the Muslim-Croat Federation and that a statement demanding the resolution of this problem has been inserted in the final document on border corrections, ratified by Implementation Force Commander Admiral Smith among others. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Official Says Brcko Arbitration Cannot Proceed

LD1507223896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2139 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Jul (SRNA)—Vitimir Popovic, Serb Republic representative at the commission for arbitration for the Brcko area, has sent a letter to international envoy Carl Bildt saying that "the Serb Republic cannot embark upon arbitration without a prior definition of the subject of the dispute."

In the letter that was sent on 13 July and forwarded to SRNA this evening, Popovic says that this position was adopted by the Serb Republic assembly and government.

"According to customary practice, confirmed by international courts, the rule is that first the subject of the dispute should be defined through an arbitral compromise, sources on which a verdict is to be based should be specified and only after that an arbitrator appointed," the letter to Bildt says, adding:

"You insisted at the last meeting that the third arbitrator be appointed, with the subject of the dispute being defined at a later date, which we cannot accept."

One could start from the assumption that the subject of the dispute was set out in Article 5, Point 1 of the Agreement on Interentity Boundaries and related issues,

and in the Annex to the second general framework agreement which says:

"The sides agree to be bound by arbitration on a section of the interentity boundary line in the Brcko area, as indicated on the map in the addendum," which could, possibly, be acceptable.

Popovic goes on to remind Bildt that "the maps on which the Agreement is based and which define the subject of the dispute are lacking."

"Without the maps on which the agreement is explicitly based, the agreement is defective and it is not possible either to appoint an arbiter or initiate the arbitration process. As you know, the agreement can be altered by the sides but not by the arbiters," Popovic says in his letter, and adds:

"We propose that you use your undisputed authority and bring your influence to bear on the sides to make available the maps on which the agreement is based, or make a new compromise and establish the subject of the dispute in order to select the third arbiter, set up the arbitration council and begin the arbitration process as quickly as possible.

"We demand that actions accord with the rules established in the practical work of international courts. Deviation from the rules of international law could have serious consequences."

B-H: Serb Pullout From Brcko Arbitration Talks Reported

*AU1507173596 Paris AFP in English
1722 GMT 15 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 15 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serbs have pulled out of arbitration efforts on the future of the contested northern town of Brcko, a spokesman for Bosnia's top civilian official said Monday.

In a letter to Carl Bildt, the international community's High Representative to Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb official dealing with Brcko said he was withdrawing from talks because no map had been produced of the area, the spokesman said.

The future status of Brcko, a river port town in northern Bosnia, was never fully settled during the Dayton peace talks which ended the conflict last year. Instead, it was agreed by Bosnia's Muslims and Serbs, who both claim the town, that it would be resolved by arbitration during 1996.

Mohamed Sacirbegovic, Bosnia's representative to the United Nations, said the Serb move "does not bode well for the Dayton process and seems to be directly

undermining the movement of the Dayton process forward."

Sacirbegovic, who was one of the signatories to the agreement, said the Serbs were trying "to create facts on the ground and preempt any action by the arbitration system."

The town is currently controlled by the Serbs, but had a non-Serb majority before the war. Brcko was bitterly fought over during 1992 and its Muslim and Croat population expelled by Serb forces.

Bildt's spokesman Colum Murphy said the Bosnian Serbs had been responsible for producing the map in question. However, he added there was "considerable confusion" among both parties over the arbitration process.

He also said the Serbs failed to nominate a third arbitrator for the talks, as required by the Dayton accord.

This, however, would be resolved by the International Court of Justice which would nominate an arbitrator to sit alongside the Muslim and Serb arbitrators.

B-H: Serb Official Denies Withdrawal From Brcko Arbitration

*LD1507225796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
2204 GMT 15 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Jul (SRNA)—Vladimir Popovic, Serb Republic representative at the commission for arbitration for the Brcko area, this evening denied the rumors that he had withdrawn from the arbitration commission and said he demanded that the international community provide maps relating to the subject of the dispute.

In a statement to SRNA, Popovic said that he had sent a letter to international envoy Carl Bildt two days ago underscoring that "without the definition of the subject of the dispute, the Serb Republic cannot embark upon arbitration, i.e., it cannot do so without maps that clearly show the disputed parts."

"I have been appointed by the Serb Republic People's Assembly and I will do this job until it is completed, but in accordance with the approved platform," the Serb Republic arbitrator went on to say, adding that the rumors on his withdrawal from the commission were "fabricated."

Asked to comment on the statement by the FRY Government which expressed its "disapproval of the decision by the Serb Republic representative to withdraw from the international arbitration on the status of Brcko," Popovic said:

"If the Yugoslav Government wants me to sign that the subject of the future arbitration is to be Brcko, then I cannot do anything like that, because that does not fall within my competence."

He added that this kind of thing was not within the competent authority of anyone in the Serb Republic but "only the sides which signed the Dayton agreement."

Popovic said the agreement says that "what is in dispute is part of the interentity boundary line in the Brcko area, marked on the map which is appended in the addendum."

"We have to have a copy of the agreement in its entirety. This includes the maps, so that it can be clearly seen which part of the boundary line is being referred to."

Commenting on Bildt's contacts with the international court on the appointment of a third arbiter, Dr. Popovic said:

"I pointed out that the basic preconditions for the appointment of the third arbiter have not been fulfilled. And if they appoint him, we will not join in the arbitration process, because the subject of the dispute has not been fully defined, only outlined."

B-H: Official Explains Serb Entity, Federation Land Exchanges

AU1207093896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by M. Cviko: "The Movement of Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Around 50 square km of land, or approximately 0.1 percent of the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have been exchanged according to the agreement on the adaptation of interentity border lines, as established by the Dayton agreement. The talks, which have taken six months (the IFOR [Implementation Force] had assisted in the last four months), will be continued in the next 10 to 15 days, because some controversial issues in Krajina, around Dobo, Celic, and Han Pijesak, have still not been taken care of. Moreover, it is necessary to reach an agreement on the controversial territories in Herzegovina, the Posavina, and around Jajce, Mugdim Cukle told us. Cukle is a member of the expert team of the Government of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina for borderline (razgranicenje) issues.

"The Dayton agreement is too general and, understandably, it did not deal with details. However, it was the basis that we adhered to (Annex 2, Article 2). Our work at the mutual and bilateral meetings was actually the 'moving' of the Dayton agreement," Cukle said. IFOR was of great help in the organization of meetings in

Ilidza, as well as in enabling constant visitations of the terrain, in order to obtain a real view of the situation. In the beginning the talks were more difficult. That is because, as usual, the principles needed to be agreed upon first. The Serb side then had the opposite opinion—they wanted to change not only villages and settlements (zaseoci), but also some territories that are of a greater strategic importance (which Cukle did not want to list). As time passed, the talks became fully correct.

This "movement" moved homes for around 8,000 inhabitants back into the Federation. On the other hand, around 3,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina will live in the Serb entity. In comparison to those settlements that are now in the Serb entity, those settlements that are connected to the Federation are much larger, both in size, as well as in the number of inhabitants. Since it was worked out on the "one for one" principle, this difference was compensated by the larger number of square kilometers that were given up.

The villages of Otok and Arapus, in the area of Bosanska Krupa, have joined the Federation; as well as the villages Jasenica (which was in the hands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army even before the Dayton agreement), Okanovici, Omeragici, and Huskici in the area of Gradacac; Dubravice Donje and Dolina Ravanj close to Brcko; part of the Tursunovo Brdo village in the Taocak municipality; the villages of Kovacevici, Mahmutovici, part of Vitnica, Neruk (part of the Federation before the Dayton agreement), and Vrela Strana in the area around Zvornik; the village of Sahinovici in the vicinity of Kalesija; and the Turalici village in the vicinity of Vlasenica.

Corrections were made in the region of Sarajevo, namely, in Hrasnica, so that now the entire Famos factory is within the Federation. In the region around Mostar, the Serb entity gave up a wide area around Gornji Zijemalj.

In the area around Bosanska Krupa, the Serb Republic was given the village of Hasani; then the Krecane, Zdrebane, and Pribrnice villages in the area around Gradacac; the Dubravice Gornje village in the area between Brcko and Celic; part of Konjikovici, as well as Potras in the area around Majevisa and Zvornik; the Dzemati village (where almost all of the inhabitants are of Serb nationality) in the Lopara municipality; as well as part of the Osmaci village in the Kalesija municipality.

In the Sarajevo area, part of Vojkovic has been given to the Serb Republic, as well as the wider region around Donji Zijemalj in the Mostar municipality.

Cukle added that an agreement was made on the level of the subcommittees, regarding the exchange of parts of the Maglaj municipality—the village of Donja Rijecica for the village of Krtala in the Lukavac municipality. For what has been agreed upon to take place, ratification by the state bodies is necessary.

Although our delegation was put together in a federal way (Bosniaks and Croats), the territories that should be exchanged between the Serb Republic and the part of the Federation controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense

Council] were not discussed. Cukle said that the already mentioned parts of Herzegovina, the Posavina, and the town of Jajce are controversial, and that the possibility of bilateral agreements is not excluded.

At the end, Mugdim Cukle repeated that the border lines that have just been agreed upon are nothing more than what was foreseen by the Dayton agreement—not a border, but interentity lines within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: UN Says Serb Women's Protest in Vukovar 'Peaceful'

AU1507160896 Paris AFP in English
1557 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 15 (AFP)—Hundreds of Serb women demonstrated Monday outside the UN headquarters in the Serb-controlled eastern Croatian town of Vukovar, a UN spokesman said.

Douglas Coffman said that "a couple of hundred" people, mainly women, were demonstrating outside the compound demanding investigations be opened into the alleged murders of Serbs in 1990 and 1991.

The women, from the Women's Association of Vukovar Municipality, called for the extension of the UN mandate in the region and for it to be given autonomy or special status, the spokesman said.

"They're having a peaceful protest, letting off steam," he told AFP over the telephone from Vukovar.

The United Nations is temporarily administering the region, known as Eastern Slavonia and which borders Serbia, which is the last part of Croatia under Serb control.

Its mandate is due to end on January 15, 1997 but can be extended once if either side requests and if the UN Security Council so decrees.

Coffman said the demonstrators were also protesting that their Croatian state pensions were being paid in the Croatian currency, and demanding the United Nations take action to prevent threatening telephone calls they said they had received since phone links were restored with Croatia.

Under an agreement between Croatia and the rebel Serbs, the area is due to return to Croatian control and the UN has been supervising its reintegration into civilian structures such as pensions and the telephone network.

Rebel Serbs who captured the area in the conflict which broke out in 1991 effectively cut links with Croatia, hoping for integration into Serbia.

Coffman said the demonstration began around 7 a.m. (0500 GMT). He said the atmosphere was peaceful and members of staff had gone out and spoken to them. Some of the demonstrators had come inside the compound and spoken to senior UN official Gerald Fisher.

He said the women had promised to stay until they received answers to their demands.

"We'll give them answers, but not necessarily the ones they want to hear.... There's a peace agreement and we're here to implement the peace agreement," he said.

Croatia: Zagreb Accused of Ordering B-H Refugees to Mostar

AU1507145496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 Jul 96

[Report by Nada al Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Can the expelled Bosniaks really start returning to western Mostar?

On Friday [12 July] Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian Prime Ministers Hasan Muratovic and Zlatko Matesa agreed in Dubrovnik that the refugees from the territory of the federation can start returning from Croatia to Bosnia now. However, this seems to have been taken literally in Croatia as the refugee camp in Stobrdje near Split has already received orders from the Croatian authorities to move out all Mostar citizens, and they are all Bosniaks. They should move out of the camp as early as today and, as they were told, go to Mostar. They immediately started surrounding the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb, asking whether they could really return to their old addresses in Mostar, for example, in the Avenija Street or to Bijeli Brijeg. Are their homes now empty? They know that their homes were taken over by others. The real answer could come from so-called western Mostar.

One should say that an agreement was reached in Dubrovnik on the return of the refugees from the federation territory from Croatia, but not by force, since return unfortunately is not possible everywhere. We have also found out that the Republic of Croatia will revoke the refugee status to all Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees as of 1 August.

Croatia: FRY Office in Zagreb Performs Consular Work

LD1507131196 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1215 GMT 15 Jul 96

["Pool" item by Savo Tomasevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 15 (TANJUG)—The until recently unthinkable phenomenon of people lining up in front of Zagreb's office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) without any fear of Croatian authorities, is a harbinger of the stepwise normalization of relations and confidence build-up between the two neighbouring states from the areas of former Yugoslavia.

As of July 15, the Yugoslav office in Zagreb performs consular work and, as office head Veljko Knezevic said, every day receives at least 50 people, mostly Serbs from Croatia but also Croats willing to travel to Yugoslavia.

As time passes by, citizens in increasing numbers come to the office and, after full five years, re-establish contacts with representatives of the official authorities of the F.R.Y., showing that the Dayton peace documents had reached the citizens themselves.

The renewal of ties between Yugoslavia and Croatia began in the spring when the Belgrade-Zagreb motorway was reopened, although this link, once very busy, still remains without heavy traffic.

Meantime, telecommunications were re-established. Also, these days oil began to reach refineries in Yugoslavia through the "Adriatic pipeline" starting from the Croatian island of Krk.

Beginning July 8, the Croatian office in Belgrade also became active with consular work as was agreed at the March meeting between the Yugoslav and Croatian foreign ministers, Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic.

Only when full diplomatic relations are established, will consular operations be extended to reach levels performed by consulates in other countries.

Croatia: Serbs Ask FRY Assembly To Pass Dual Citizenship Law

AU1507181796 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Displaced Serbs and the Baranja Democratic Forum have sent a letter to the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asking that at the next assembly session they raise the issue of passing a law on dual citizenship resembling that of the Republic of Croatia. Jovan Vljakovic has a report.

[Vljakovic] Convening the next Federal Assembly session for 16 July in Belgrade, the first and most important item on the agenda being the law on Yugoslav citizenship, has stirred up a great deal of interest not only among the Yugoslavs who will, with the adoption of this law and [word indistinct], remain [word indistinct], but also among the Yugoslavs who have been Yugoslavs, but with the war and disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will probably be Yugoslav citizens no more, though through no fault of their own.

The Association of Displaced Serbs and the Baranja Democratic Forum, prompted by convening the next assembly session, proposed asking the federal representa-

tives to consider the position of the Serbs in the province and, in considering the proposed bill on Yugoslav citizenship, to endorse the passing of dual citizenship.

"As the law on citizenship of the Republic of Croatia includes the possibility of dual citizenship, we believe that passing the same law on citizenship of the FRY would be the first step toward forming Srem-Baranja province as a European region," says the letter to the representatives of the Federal Assembly. The letter ends by saying that the possibility of retaining Yugoslav citizenship would provide help and encouragement and show that they have not been abandoned, as well as that their struggle for survival on their land will be successful.

Croatia: East Slavonian Serbs Receive Pensions in Kunas

AU1207155496 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 10 Jul 96

[Report by Milan Pesut]

[FBIS Translated Text] About 100 pensioners, mostly Croats and Hungarians and only a few Serbs, received their pensions in kunas [Croatian currency] in Darda today. In addition to the pensions, their ID cards also arrived. Our colleague Milan Pesut was there; he emphasizes that a large number of Serb pensioners did not appear because they did not want to have their pensions in Croatian currency.

[Pesut] The Serb people and their representatives in the Srem [Serb name for Srijem]-Baranja province have been cheated again in the area of agreements and cooperation with the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] and the Croatian side.

Today's event, the distribution of Croatian pensions in Darda to pensioners who live in the province and who earned their pensions in the former Yugoslavia, that is, the Socialist Republic of Croatia, is the freshest example. According to the agreement between the two sides, with the mediation of UNTAES, Croatia was, in this pilot project, supposed to deposit foreign currency for a certain number of pensioners at the Vojvodjanska Banka, after which the pensioners could withdraw their pensions by cheque in the dinar equivalent. However, things did not happen in that way.

Ivica Vrkic, a representative of the Croatian Government, in the presence of Gerard Fisher, head of UNTAES civilian affairs, distributed to the pensioners present—about 80, mostly Croats and Hungarians, and a negligible number of Serbs—envelopes containing

1,532 kunas each. In addition to the kunas, the pensioners also received certificates of Croatian citizenship and ID cards.

A large number of Serbs did not appear, because they did not want to receive their pensions in Croatian currency. Making the pensions conditional upon Croatian citizenship, taking into account that it is mostly elderly and helpless people who are involved, is a deliberate provocation. When one considers that, in addition to this, there were many Croatian reporters and even officials of the Croatian Government in charge of retirement insurance in and around the building of the Secretariat for General Administration and Public Services in Darda, the picture of this kind of hypocritical behavior and the humiliation of the people and authorities in this province becomes clear.

The fact that administrator Jacques Klein, who was supposed to arrive, did not is no surprise either. It is obvious that he was also aware of what was going to happen in Darda.

Croatia: Modernization of 'Old-Fashioned Weapons' Analyzed

AU1507085896 Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian
12 Jul 96 p 11

[Military analysis by Marijan Pavicic: "'Vulkan' Above the Battlefield"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In World War I strong fire power by ground artillery units of both warring factions—offense and defense—significantly limited the capabilities of battlefield units to conduct operations.

During World War II commanders were governed by a very different way of thinking. Fire and move—that was what the commander demanded from his subordinates.

The main consideration of commanders is reflected in the following: limited communication among artillery units and infantry and tank units, and, if possible, air force support. This pattern will represent the beginning of a new doctrine that will later on, during war and after it, be enriched and supplemented thanks to technological advance. This new example of battlefield activity will understand flexibility and the ability to adapt to a quickly changing combat situation—heavy fire accompanied by quick redeployment without preparation.

Thus, apart from the traditional towed and self-propelled artillery weapons used during World War II on the Eastern Front, tactical rockets popularly called "Kacusa" [term as published] appeared in Soviet Army units, assembled to fire a salvo. [The impact of] their use was reflected materially and psychologically. Unlike

individual launches, the culmination of VLR [multiple rocket launcher] efficiency is achieved by concentrating a large number of hits, sometimes hundreds of them, in a small area, to make artillery and rocket preparations for great offensive activities. Such density of fire, to create weight against the enemy, whose combat strength was weakened, had an exceptional material and psychological effect.

"Volcano"

In the very beginning of the Liberation and defense war in which the Republic of Croatia confronted the Serbian armed aggression, assisted by the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] (which at that time was the fourth strongest military power in Europe), Croatia very soon faced the lack of adequate weapon systems. Otherwise difficult conditions were further aggravated by the utmost unfriendliness and lack of understanding of the international community, as well as the additional limitations to rendering a more efficient armed resistance, represented by the arms embargo imposed by the UN.

At that time Croatian people were practically unarmed. All small and heavy weapons of the Republic of Croatia TO [Territorial Defense] were seized by the so-called JNA. The weapons of National Guard and MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] personnel consisted of insufficient quantities of mainly small arms.

In such circumstances the only source of weapons would be to capture them from the enemy in combat, or to seize them from the barracks of the former JNA. Many of these weapons had been damaged on purpose, certain vital parts and subsystems were missing, such as sights and artillery weapons' breeches, etc.

From these needs, but also in a wider context, and regarding the future in which the guarantee of survival will rely upon our own strength, one can see the beginning of the development of a Croatian military industry that will achieve amazing results in a very short time.

For example, one of the weapon systems captured from the JNA was the 32-barrel rocket launcher M-77 "Oganj" ["Fire"], 128 mm caliber, developed in the early seventies. As a formation, one battery consisted of six such weapons. After adopting the technology to produce 122 mm barrels, Croatian military industry converted the SVLR [Self-Propelled Multiple Rocket Launcher] "Oganj" by replacing its 32-barrel 128 mm launcher with a 32-barrel 122 mm launcher. The new weapon is called "Vulkan" ["Volcano"], and it has better tactical and technical features than "Oganj" launcher.

The 32-barrel self-propelled 122 mm rocket launcher "Vulkan" consists of a wheeled vehicle, FAP-2026 BDS/A 6x6, and a 32-barrel 122 mm rocket launcher placed on the rear part of the vehicle. The barrels of the launcher are 3000 mm long.

The self-propelled multiple rocket launcher "Vulkan" is made for strong, quick, and unexpected fire strikes onto the main direction of activity of infantry and tank units. The main characteristic of this very mobile and automated rocket weapon is great fire power, which is reflected by the very short time needed to fire rockets, either individually or in rapid fire, with high precision, and a great density of hits.

The launcher fires 122 mm rockets, 2878 mm long, with a maximum range of 20.75 km at the temperature between 15 and 20 degrees Celcius. The rockets fired from SVRL "Vulkan" are highly explosive rockets with a momentary blasting effect, with an upper momentary-striking inertial fuse. The rocket is also made of an electrical rocket capsule and solid fuel charge. The total weight of each rocket is 66 kg, of which the warhead weighs 18.5 kg, while the fuel charge weighs 20.5 kg. Rocket speed is 699 meters per second at the end of its active flight at the temperature of 10 degrees Celcius. The rockets are also produced by Croatian military industry.

The rocket launcher's horizontal field of activity left and right from the basic position has two regimes: manual 185 degrees and semiautomatic and automatic 180 degrees. The vertical, or elevation, field of activity also has two regimes: manual and semiautomatic/automatic, and varies from 0 to 50 degrees. The precision of assuming elements according to azimuth and elevation both manually and in automatic is plus-or-minus 0 to 0.002.

The time of firing rockets at individual fire is 0.8 seconds, and at rapid fire two rockets are fired within one second. There are two ways to open fire: from the vehicle cabin switchboard, or remotely from a 25-meter distance via key switch.

The launcher charger also contains a spare 32-rocket charge and enables manual charging of the launcher through the charger mechanism, and automatic charging via the switchboard. The mechanism of switching off the flexible system of the vehicle is made of four feet which enable manual switching off of the flexible system through the drive lever [sentence as published]. The vehicle's flexible system can also be switched off automatically via the switchboard in the cabin.

Weapon protection provides for protection of all main weapon components from weather conditions and camouflage in the active position.

The total time needed to fire both combat sets (both the launcher charge and the spare charge) from a single fire position is five minutes.

The SVRL system "Vulkan" has been developed to be used in a temperature range between minus 30 degrees and [positive] 50 degrees Celcius, just like most artillery and rocket weapons. Its characteristics enable it to be used in conditions of higher humidity, dirtiness, and, in general, severe weather changes and their influence and aggressive effect.

The SVLR system "Vulkan" has a five-man crew.

The FAP-2026-BDS/A 6x6 vehicle is used as the carrier of all main components of the weapon, its crew, personal and unit weapons and equipment, and is used to drive on and off road, and as the basic platform to fire the multiple rocket launcher system. The construction features of the vehicle entirely enable the usage of the SVLR on all types of terrain.

Epilogue

The SVLR is an exceptional but not the only example of Croatian military industry which, apart from developing and producing new weapons successfully according to all world standards has converted old-fashioned weapons to make their use possible with contemporary ammunition, by which one practically got a new weapon. The weapons which we came to this way are much cheaper than the new weapons with the same ballistic performance. On one hand, during the Liberation war and Serbian armed aggression, it [Croatian military industry] succeeded in supplying weapons to Croatian Army units, and on the other hand, it succeeded in preparing itself for the period of peace and for the export of domestic ideas and skills into the world market on which conversions of weapon systems take a large percentage of the dollar pie.

In the world today special attention is paid to developing cluster missiles armed with small anti-infantry bombs and antitank mines. This conversion does not significantly increase the weight of the weapon, and one maintains almost all existing logistics elements; educating the crew is necessary only regarding new ammunition.

Croatian military industry, which grew up in brutal war conditions, today can appear in international military markets to export its weapon systems that it developed on its own, as well as with the modernized (conversions) of old-fashioned weapons (guns, howitzers, tanks, VLRs). The meaning of modernizing old-fashioned weapons is carrying out minimum alterations

on a weapon, so that with a minimum financial investment one gets a modern and powerful weapons system. The reduction of military budgets, from which many armies in the world suffer, only supports the correctness of this direction and its goal.

**FYROM: SDA President Discusses Position of
Bosniaks**

96BA0351A Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian
15 May 96 p 10

[Interview with Avdiija Pepic, president of the SDA in Macedonia, by Rasid Brcic; place and date not given: "The Census Registered 7,500 Bosniaks But There Are 10 Times More of Us in Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The number of Bosniaks, 7,500, does not correspond to the actual number. According to our statistics, there are at least 10 times more of us. About 15,500 Bosniaks identified themselves as Muslims. There were dilemmas and confusion among our people. A large number of Bosniaks still have not regularized their citizenship. A large number have also remained unregistered, and citizens of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] who are currently abroad were not taken into account, either (they also include a large number of Bosniaks).*

[Brcic] At the recent Second Reelection Assembly of the Macedonian SDA [Party of Democratic Action], you were elected president of the party. To start this interview, please tell us about the Macedonian SDA, when it was founded, and then about the personnel changes in the party.

[Pepic] The Macedonian SDA was founded on 26 October 1991 in Skopje when the founding assembly was also held, and attended by then General Secretary of the party Irfan Ajanovic, as a special emissary from President Alija Izetbegovic.

With the process of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the independence of its republics, including Macedonia, it became legally necessary to register the party at the republic level, which was done on 30 March 1992. There have been personnel changes in the party, which is normal, in view of the political events in recent years in Macedonia. The latest changes were made at the Second Reelection Assembly on 20 January 1996. In the presence of 180 representatives of all the municipal organizations, I was elected president, Tale Kravac and Nedzib Bacevac were elected vice presidents, and Nafija Semsovic was elected secretary. A Main Committee (25 members) was also elected, along with a Court of Honor and an Oversight Committee. Bejto Drndar was elected as chairman of the Main Committee, and Zecir Kurbardovic as his deputy. The members of the Executive Committee are Sefko Drndar, Omer Hodzic, Avdo Kolasinac, Fazlija Kardovic, and Salko Rizvanovic.

[Brcic] What are the Macedonian SDA's political goals?

[Pepic] The Macedonian SDA's political goals are defined by the party's statute and program declaration.

Those are affirmation of basic human rights and freedoms; support for democracy in the country's social and political life; preservation of the sovereignty of Macedonia and its territorial integrity as established by the constitution; the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders; a just resolution of the political status of Sandzak and the Bosniak people in Sandzak; the affirmation of Bosniaks in Macedonia; the free activity of religious communities; consistent implementation of the principles of a market economy; consistent and principled cooperation with all progressive and democratic forces in Macedonia; full respect for the rules of democracy and civilization in the work of the Macedonian SDA.

[Brcic] What did you give priority to?

[Pepic] Priority was given to the affirmation of Bosniaks, their unhindered cultural and all other progressive development, with respect for the cultural and cultural values and achievements of the Macedonian people and other nationalities.

[Brcic] What is the status of Bosniaks in Macedonia, and what are the interests of Bosniaks in Macedonia?

[Pepic] The Macedonian SDA, as the sole political entity that protects the interests of Bosniaks in Macedonia, is focused on defining and guiding the interests of Bosniaks in Macedonia. A platform has been compiled for resolving the Bosniak national question in Macedonia. It is in accordance with international documents, with the desire to protect and guarantee the human, civil, and legitimate ethnic rights of Bosniaks in Macedonia in a peaceful and civilized way.

The platform has been delivered to the Macedonian government and Assembly, the council on interethnic relations, diplomatic and consular representations, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission, and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. This platform contains the basic demands of Bosniaks in Macedonia, which we identified together with Geert Ahrens, a representative of the International Conference. We want to have the constitutional and legal position of Bosniaks in Macedonia equivalent to that of all the other nationalities that are already listed in the constitution; we are seeking to have instruction in the Bosnian language conducted in areas with a majority Bosniak population; the right to proportional reporting in the Bosnian language on radio, TV, and other media; the right to establish cultural, scientific, educational, and humanitarian institutions; and a guarantee of free religious choice. That would create the conditions for Bosniaks' equality with the other citizens and ethnic collectives in Macedonia.

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[Brcic] What is the attitude of the international community and the Macedonian authorities toward resolving the status of Bosniaks?

[Pepic] We have had several meetings with Geert Ahrens. Our requests met with sympathy. In order to start realizing them, however, it would be necessary to have a direct meeting with representatives of the Macedonian government. That meeting has not taken place, and that means that concrete solutions are still not in sight.

[Brcic] What is the party's position on the results of the census and the number of Bosniaks in Macedonia?

[Pepic] The number of Bosniaks, 7,500, does not correspond to the actual number. According to our statistics, there are at least 10 times more of us. About 15,500 Bosniaks identified themselves as Muslims. There were dilemmas and confusion among our people. A large number of Bosniaks have not yet regularized their citizenship. A large number also remained unregistered, and citizens of Macedonia who are currently abroad (including a large number of Bosniaks) were not taken into account either.

[Brcic] What is the party's position on the initiative to schedule special parliamentary elections, and a possible coalition in those elections?

[Pepic] Early elections would be a significant step in the development of democracy, but without a new electoral system they would not give the right answer on the further political development of Macedonia. The existing electoral model does not represent all parties in parliament uniformly. Macedonia, which has about 40 registered political parties, is best suited by a combined majority-proportional electoral system. In it, both Bosniaks and Macedonians see their chance for representatives in parliament.

A coalition is possible with all parties whose programs are similar to ours, and which advocate peace, social security, and national equality.

[Brcic] What is your relationship with the Islamic Community in Macedonia, and what is your position in regard to the appearance of the so-called Muslim Religious Community in Macedonia, whose president is Jakub Selimoski?

[Pepic] Those are activities that can only harm Muslims in Macedonia. Our position is that we do not support those activities. Our relationship with the existing Macedonian Islamic Community is still satisfactory, but I think that room has to be left for us to resolve disagreements through open talks within the framework of the Islamic Community.

[Brcic] What is your attitude toward the Macedonian state?

[Pepic] We have proven that we consider Macedonia our own state. We have supported all its positive achievements on the international level. We think that what is harmful for Macedonia is those political forces which define Macedonia as an exclusive national state of Macedonians, oriented against the identity and interests of other nationalities in Macedonia. The demands for a binational state are also harmful.

[Brcic] What is the party's position on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Pepic] Since the very beginning, we have had a clear position that it is a case of conventional aggression by Serbia and Montenegro against an internationally recognized state and a member of the UN.

It is well known that a large number of Bosniaks, fleeing from the Chetnik knives, found salvation in Macedonia. The Macedonian SDA and the Bosniak people, in this situation, showed great charity by accepting and caring for our brethren expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina. More than 30,000 of our compatriots were accepted, and all citizens of Macedonia, especially Albanians, showed a great deal of solidarity with our brethren.

[Brcic] And what is the Macedonian SDA's attitude toward the problem of the Bosniak people in Sandzak?

[Pepic] In the last 80 years, that part of our people has been subjected to state terror by Serbia and Montenegro, and at certain moments it assumed the nature of genocide. Our attitude toward Sandzak is in accordance with international and European principles in settling the Yugoslav crisis.

[Brcic] In your opinion, how will relations between Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina develop after Dayton and Paris?

[Pepic] Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have common interests in raising the level of their mutual relations. There are several reasons for that. Both countries are firmly committed to being part of Europe, they have an identical position on succession to the former Yugoslavia, and their economic situation impels them toward direct cooperation. The existence of Bosniaks in Macedonia and Macedonians in Bosnia-Herzegovina also induces the two countries to be more open toward each other, which is in their common interest. The establishment of diplomatic and consular relations between these two countries would therefore accelerate these processes considerably.

Poland: Kwasniewski on U.S. Visit, Relations With Russia

LD1607111596 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0615 GMT 16 Jul 96

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by unidentified correspondent; from the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Good morning, sir. [passage omitted]

Today everyone is ready for the fact that President Kwasniewski is starting the first vacation of his term of office.

[Kwasniewski] Yes, a vacation which I wish to spend observing the Olympic Games at least in part. That is why I am flying to New York today for two days of political meetings with Polonia groups and lots of interviews with American business milieux. On Wednesday I go to Atlanta, and then I wish to cut myself off from politics a bit and experience this great thing which I have had the opportunity of seeing before—the Olympic Games.

[Correspondent] Today you are also to have what will be the third interview for CNN within a week—this is the largest television network.

[Kwasniewski] The third and the third one live. It seems I am a more frequent guest on CNN than on Polish Television. But I think that the significance of this is that CNN is received very widely in the United States and throughout the world, and this is a good place in which it is possible to express Polish reasoning and Polish arguments. Apart from that, there will be many interviews on important American channels. I would wish that this part of my visit be focused above all on economic matters much more than on NATO matters since the main subjects of my previous discussions and interviews were nonetheless security matters, NATO matters. I would now like there to be more of the economy.

[Correspondent] But during this stay in Atlanta you will also meet the President of the United States.

[Kwasniewski] We will all meet together. This is something exceptional. A hotel has been prepared as at every Olympic Games. This hotel, the Marriott in Atlanta—there will be 76 presidents and prime ministers staying there, as well as members of the Olympic Committee.

[Correspondent] That is where the great politics will be?

[Kwasniewski] That is where politics will be at its most pleasant for it is enough to go down to breakfast, or go

to the swimming pool, or the bar, to be able to speak about the most important matters with partners from various corners of the world. [passage omitted]

This is the kind of atmosphere that favors frankness. Apart from that, this is also a political meeting but altogether without protocol.

[Correspondent] But I understand that during the meeting with President Clinton you will say something about NATO.

[Kwasniewski] I have already had the opportunity to speak with President Bill Clinton, and at the White House, and thus at a place where everything is minuted. Later I had the opportunity for a brief face-to-face talk. There we spoke above all of matters concerning NATO and matters of our bilateral relations. I think President Clinton will take to heart the argument that I stubbornly sought to implant in his head, namely that each American president has gone down in history for something. President Reagan was the one who took part in the overthrow of communism, George Bush was the president who participated in the unification of Germany. President Clinton, on the other hand, has the historic opportunity to be the American President who contributes to the unification of Europe, to the expansion of NATO, to the inclusion of new states in those structures that have hitherto divided Europe. This seems to me, from the point of view of the American president's thinking, a convincing argument. Each of them wishes to go down in history, as indeed every politician wishes to play such a role.

[Correspondent] Just after the meeting with the President of the United States you said that there was a generational chemistry. What is this generational chemistry?

[Kwasniewski] President Clinton will be 50 this year, in October. I will be 42 in November. I think that—taking into account the geographical difference—our generation nonetheless grew up in fairly similar conditions. This is a postwar generation, a generation that looks with much greater attention at the possibilities of dialogue and contacts, which has always travelled, which has been mutually interested in itself. As a very young man, exactly 20 years ago, I made a completely private trip to the United States and visited very many American states. While a student President Clinton came to Czechoslovakia, for instance, which was made much of in the electoral campaign, but this was because he was interested in how this region of Europe looked, how life is lived here, how people think. So I think this generation's approach to many matters is different from that of the generation marked by the war.

[Correspondent] Do such intergenerational differences hinder your contacts with Boris Yeltsin?

[Kwasniewski] To some degree, yes. This is an altogether different sort of contact. This is nonetheless a contact between people who come from rather different worlds or experiences, and this difference is a clear one. This is, if only, the desire to establish such an altogether direct and informal contact, which in the case of President Clinton and altogether younger politicians is something natural. In the case of older politicians this is more of a matter of protocol, something with a greater distance. But not all, since I also know older politicians with a very open stance. For instance, [Italian] President Scalfaro, whom I have hosted, is a person in his seventies with an extraordinary ability for making contact and for openness.

[Correspondent] Is it a matter of indifference to Poland whether Yeltsin or General Lebed and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin rule in Russia?

[Kwasniewski] What is important is that democratic elections have taken place in Russia and that they took place with a high turnout. That means that the Russians as a people, the Russians as a society, accept democracy. That in my opinion is the greatest success of these elections, that they were clean, that there are no reservations as to that.

The fact that they were won by Yeltsin is of course better for us because Yeltsin is a person who in my view has a greater determination to reform and change that country than his rival candidate. The fact that today it is not actually that clear who rules in the Kremlin is, well, a problem, but it is necessary to express the view that the troubles of President Yeltsin are transitory and that he will nonetheless be the person who takes matters into his hands and will wish to hand Russia over to a succeeding president as a country that is more democratic, better organized, with a higher standard of living, with a better economy, and I judge that this group around President Yeltsin happens to be rather varied. [passage omitted]

It is necessary to remember that each Russian politician has in his heart the greatness of Russia. This will always be a difficulty in talks with them, they will always look at it [?like this].

[Correspondent] Who will represent Poland in Moscow? Who will the new ambassador be?

[Kwasniewski] Well, from the information that we have, it transpires that it will be Andrzej Zaluski, but I comment upon the ambassador only when the appropriate documents come to me, to my desk, and then I either sign them or else I have my doubts.

[Correspondent] Will you sign such a nomination?

[Kwasniewski] I think that a relatively young, dynamic man, speaking Russian and English well, and with political and diplomatic experience and with a certain, particular talent is required in Moscow, a talent that was for instance possessed by Stanislaw Ciosek, or is possessed by Stanislaw Ciosek [outgoing Polish ambassador in Moscow]. It is that of making the Polish Embassy a place to which people come and which is open to various politicians, to various options, a place where there are good meetings, good discussions, good receptions. Where, quite simply, there is an active life. This cannot be an ambassador-analyst, hidden away behind his desk, who only analyzes the press or documents and passes on materials to his head office. This must be a person who is active on the difficult Russian market. This also means that it is necessary to have the health to cope with this work. So, there are very many parameters that have to be taken into account here.

[Correspondent] Are they all met by Andrzej Zaluski?

[Kwasniewski] I think so. [passage omitted]

Poland: Daily Comments on Walesa, Kwasniewski Visits to U.S.

WS1507120596 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 15 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Edward Krzemien: "Two Presidents Played Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past month two presidents have visited Washington: first former President Lech Walesa, then the incumbent President Kwasniewski. Both visits served Poland well. Paradoxically enough, the success of Kwasniewski's visit was largely due to his predecessor—at home, Walesa refuses even to shake hands with his successor.

Most impressive of all is the fact that Walesa and Kwasniewski said exactly the same things about the advancement of reforms and Poland's credibility as a U.S. partner. This helped dispel the doubts U.S. politicians still have about the postcommunist camp.

Walesa told Clinton he did not feel like a loser because democracy—and thus Poland—had prevailed. He did not criticize his political adversaries. Neither was there any dissonance between the two presidents on Polish-Jewish relations. A month ago Walesa supported Kwasniewski in the rift with the chairman of the U.S. Polonia Congress who had accused the Polish authorities of being overly submissive to the Jewish communities. The Americans want Poland to be a credible partner. This is

indispensable for the White House in the delicate game targeted at enlarging NATO. In order to admit Poland—which seems decided already—the Clinton administration must convince its own Congress and its allies as well as develop pragmatic formulas of cooperation with the Baltic republics, Ukraine and those states of Central Europe which still do not stand a chance of becoming members.

Those two visits have undoubtedly brought us closer to NATO.

Poland: Solidarity Prepares for Parliamentary Elections

WS1607114496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 16 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by "DOM": "'Solidarity' Chairman Sent a Letter to the ROP Chairman; Preparing an Election Staff"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Solidarity" Chairman Marian Krzaklewski announced that the "Solidarity" Election Initiative [AWS] will suggest the composition of its election staff and a working group to prepare the trade union and associated parties for the elections possibly as early as the end of August or early September.

At a news conference held yesterday, Krzaklewski was accompanied by Chairman of the Center Accord Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Arkadiusz Urban, a representative of the Christian-National Union. Kaczynski said that the AWS election tickets should be developed at the grassroots level in the regions. The AWS will collect information on individuals who could be placed at the top of the lists and act as major figures in the elections.

Krzaklewski said he had sent a letter to Jan Olszewski, the chairman of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], suggesting a "continuation of the dialogue." The "Solidarity" chairman maintains that if pre-election opinion polls show the Democratic Left Alliance to be a serious rival, the ROP and "Solidarity" should form an alliance. He did not exclude a different solution—that both groups sign only a tactical agreement and run in the elections separately.

Krzaklewski was not enthusiastic about the idea of the Peasant-Independence Coalition that an Election Initiative Convent be established under the leadership of Lech Walesa, former Senat Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski, and the "Solidarity" chairman himself. The convent would settle disputes pertaining to the election tickets. The "Solidarity" chairman claims that the entire AWS must formulate an opinion on the issue. Krzaklewski upheld his claim that although an alliance

between his trade union and the Freedom Union is impossible, both groups can seek agreement on specific points of their platforms.

Poland: Defense Ministry Structure Reform Detailed

WS1607114096 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 15 Jul 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Robert Kowal: "Reforming the Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two regulations passed by the Council of Ministers are to become effective a few weeks from today. They will substantially change the structure of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] and detail the scope of responsibilities of the defense minister. The new regulations are an important element of reforming our Armed Forces and adapting them to NATO standards.

Last December, parliament passed the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister—which defines the prerogatives of the defense minister as the chief state administrative authority in the field of defense. The basic provision is that in times of peace the Armed Forces are supervised by the defense minister, which are commanded in his name by the chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The legislature authorized the government to develop executive statutes expounding the general provisions of the law.

On 18 January, Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski established a commission chaired by his first deputy Andrzej Karkoszka. The team was to develop two documents: on passing the MON Statute and on the detailed scope of activities of the defense minister. On 9 July, these documents were adopted as a package of ordinances by the Council of Ministers, which decided that they were to become effective two weeks after they were publicly announced.

Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka's deputy [on the commission] was Major General Jaroslaw Bielecki from the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The team in charge of restructuring held 28 sessions with more than 30 participants—nearly all department heads from the MON and heads of the directorates of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. After more than 100 hours in session, documents resulting from "a reasonable compromise"—as General Bielecki puts it—were developed together with various other reform projects.

The MON statute is an annex to the ordinance of the Council of Ministers and describes the new structure of the MON in detail. The MON is to consist of the Minister's Office, which is further subdivided into the

departments of: Administration and Coordination, International Security, Budget, Economic Affairs, Infrastructure, Staffing and Military Education, Control, Law, Development and Implementation, Social Affairs and Education, the Defense System, Armament and Military Equipment, Foreign Military Affairs, and Cooperation With NATO.

Three new organizational units have thus been formed with the aim of coordinating activities targeted at joining NATO. The Departments of Administration and Coordination, Control, Military Staffing and Education, and the Legal Department—which is to be further subdivided into the Parliamentary and Presidium Offices—will be subordinated directly to the minister. The Presidium Office will be responsible for contacts with extraministerial institutions responsible for national defense.

The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces is to be one of the five branches of the MON. It is to consist of the following directorates: Command, Supplies, Mobilization and Recruitment, Territorial Defense, General, Operations and Strategies, Organization, Logistical Protection Planning, Programming the Development of the Armed Forces, Reconnaissance and Radioelectronic Warfare, Troop Training, Technical, Communications and Computer Science Troops, Military Healthcare, and Topographical Division. The MON will also oversee the Press and Information Office and the Complaints and Intervention Bureau.

The regulations provide that the General Staff is a commanding and planning structure coordinating the joint operations of the three types of troops. The new regulations create conditions for the establishment of Land Forces Headquarters which could operate alongside the Navy Command Headquarters and the Air Force and Air Defense. Military districts are to be retained, at least for the time being.

An annex to the statute lists organizational units subordinated to the minister of national defense or to units supervised by him. (We wrote about this more extensively in the 131st issue of POLSKA ZBROJNA). The regulations authorize the minister to fuse, transform, or dissolve the units specified in the statute, if need be, provided he informs the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers of the changes. Moreover, the minister can establish advisory councils, specifying their name, composition, and the scope and procedures of their operations.

The second ordinance lists the responsibilities of the defense minister. They include: development of the assumptions of the state defense system; implementation of the government's decisions and instructions in the field of defense, and coordination of the implementation

of the tasks involved; general supervision over defense tasks implemented by organs of the state administration, self-government and economic subjects; overall supervision over the implementation of the universal military duty obligation; command over the Armed Forces.

The minister implements the state's foreign policy. Therefore, he is authorized to define the principles of the operations of Polish military missions abroad. He also supervises the Military Police and the Military Information Services, in particular their operations and reconnaissance activities.

The Most Important Stage of Reform

The defense minister has been put under an obligation to submit periodic reports to the president and the prime minister on the condition of the Armed Forces, develop and implement information policies in the field of defense, supervise the military judicial system insofar as the performance of professional soldiers within it is concerned, oversee organizational and staffing issues in the chaplaincy, and define the principles and procedures of cooperating with the chaplains.

As a result of the regulations adopted by the government, some 40-50 top level staffers from so-called general positions will have to be dismissed. As an effect of the restructuring, at this stage Armed Forces staffing will be reduced in the civilian branch and in the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

Deputy Minister Karkoszka, the head of the restructuring team, stresses that the new regulations will make it possible to manage the state defense system more effectively. The mechanisms of civilian, democratic control over the Armed Forces will be strengthened, the structure of the MON will be simplified, and redundant units shadowing each other in the civilian and military branches will be dissolved. The organization and competence standards of the Polish Armed Forces will thus be adapted to those applied in NATO states. Immediately after the government passed the ordinances, the commission began completing the MON Regulations, which are to provide for—among other things—the inner organization and scope of tasks of the particular MON units. This will be the final phase of developing the executive acts to the December law.

The deputy defense minister assures that a comprehensive reform of the MON will be completed by the fall. The most important task has already been carried out.

[Box, p 3]

The Defense Minister
The Minister's Office

Director General

- Administration and Coordination Department
- Department of Control
- Legal Department
- Department of Staffing and Military Education
- Secretary of State—First Deputy Defense Minister
- Defense System Department
- International Security Department
- Military Foreign Affairs Department
- Department for Cooperation with NATO
- Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
- General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
- Undersecretary of State for Economic and Financial Issues
- Economic Department
- Budget Department
- Undersecretary of State for Social and Parliamentary Affairs
- Socioeducational Department
- Complaints and Intervention Department
- Undersecretary of State for Armament
- Armament and Military Equipment Department
- Development and Implementation Department
- Infrastructure Department

Poland: Prospects for Foreign Aircraft Purchases

WS1207132196 Poznan WPROST in Polish 7 Jul 96 pp 34-35

[Article by Miroslaw Cielemecki: "Highway to Heaven"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For almost two years the world's greatest arms manufacturers have been making efforts to participate in the modernization of the Polish air forces. However, the Defense Ministry has not invited any tenders yet; foreign contractors feel more and more confused. In the meantime, politicians—from the present coalition in particular—have also joined the battle for the air contract of the century. The adjudication results may influence the course of next year's parliamentary elections.

The Polish combat air force is in a constantly deteriorating state. Just a few scores of aircraft meet the requirements of the present age. The treaty on European conventional armed forces allows Poland to have 460 combat aircraft. Today there are about 350. This year, eleven SU-21 machines will be scrapped. Between 1996 and 1999, 110 aircraft of the MIG-21 type are to be withdrawn. If we do not decide to purchase new aircraft equipment in a few years' time, the Polish sky will be protected by basically two more-or-less efficient groups of fighter- and fighter-bomber planes, i.e., by approximately 70 aircraft. Exchange of the obsolete machines produced in the Soviet Union must begin this

year. Polish air forces need about 100 modern multi-purpose planes. One costs \$25-35 million.

The Polish air contract of the century is estimated at \$3-5 billion.

Foreign producers do not really know with whom to hold trade talks. Even two, three years ago they believed that the decisions about new armaments would be taken mainly by air force generals. It resulted in paid trips of prominent representatives of the Polish air force command, who later wholeheartedly praised the advantages of some aircraft. Then came the time of travel for parliament deputies and politicians. Finally, industry and trade union representatives joined the selection procedure. "The decision about purchasing a certain type of multipurpose supersonic aircraft will be strategic, and it is to settle the shape of our air forces for dozens of years; it will also determine the fate of Polish aircraft and defense industries, and their research and development base," states the declaration of the Polish industrial lobby.

The end of the nineties is a very favorable period for those countries which can afford to change their armaments. Most arms manufacturers do not employ almost half of their production capacity and are ready to sell their products at exceptionally low prices. Moreover, after the changes on the world's political map, a struggle is going on over a new division of the markets. For instance, the American lobby of arms producers has been assigned \$25 million to promote its output. Almost every western state more or less officially supports its own arms, particularly the aircraft industry. This results in more and more advantageous offers for potential arms recipients.

Arms manufacturers are simply competing in their bids for the Polish Army. The U.S. Air Force has an excess of approximately 200 unused outdated F-16A and F-16B aircraft. Two years ago Americans offered Poland the purchase of machines stored in a desert airfield; we were to pay \$6 million for each. The repair and modernization of each aircraft would cost at least \$4 million. But the additional cost of this transaction was \$350 million for the so-called concurrent logistics and spare parts. In the middle of the year the Lockheed Martin concern put forward a much better offer. According to its first variant, Poland would be given free outdated F-16 aircraft of the A or B series. The second plan provided for expedient sales of planes used by the U.S. Air Force today. The third offer concerned the possibility of buying (with preferential credits and so-called offset) the most up-to-date F-16 C or D aircraft for \$25 million each. At the present moment there are no less than six groups of American specialists in Poland.

Lockheed's main rival—the McDonnell Douglas consortium—has joined the bidding process this year. The U.S. Navy's air force withdrew over 20 McDonnell F-18 Hornet machines, and Poland was offered a free five-year contract to lease seven of these modern, but quite expensive planes. The whole operation—including repair, training, equipment etc.—would cost about \$150 million. It has been unofficially reported that the Polish Air Force command is about to accept this bid if the number of hornets offered at the same price is increased to twelve, i.e., one squadron.

"Each donation of aircraft will become a 'Trojan horse' for the Polish aircraft industry," warns Andre Dacyl, a representative of the Swedish arms industry. The Swedes have also recently offered Poland a very lucrative contract to lease a group of used Viggen aircraft. The condition—probably a preference for the Swedish offer of the modern and relatively inexpensive Gripen plane. "The choice of aircraft will place us in the [geographical] area of influence associated with it for dozens of years," estimates Witold Wisniewski, director of the Institute of Aviation. The region already selected by Poland is the group of NATO countries. This puts the American producers (McDonnell and Lockheed) in a privileged position and tends to eliminate the Russians—who have offered quite profitable cooperation in the production of a modernized version of the MIG-29 plane in Mielec. Swedish manufacturers are left in an undesirable position as well.

The Swedes have verified their tactics and are trying to enter the Polish market via British Aerospace, which sells Gripens.

The Polish aircraft industry is most interested in an offer that allows it to participate, to the greatest possible extent, in the production of the airplane. Last year, the SAAB group (the Gripen producer) held negotiations on the possible purchase of the WSK Mielec Aircraft Factory. But the transaction was never concluded. The French were eager to open an assembly shop for their Mirage jets. Today manufacturers are outvying one another in the so-called offset, i.e., the number of contract-associated investments in the aircraft and other industries. If the deal is worth \$3 billion, the Americans are willing to engage another \$3 billion, and the Swedes—even \$4.5 billion. Under consideration is also the possibility of replacing offsets with direct investment in the aircraft industry and other related lines, or even withhold mediation in the foreign sales of certain Polish commodities such as copper, sulfur, or coal.

The Polish aircraft industry is in a difficult situation; thus, it is looking forward to the boom elicited by

the bidding. The Defense Ministry budget allows it to purchase just two or three modern aircraft per year. So, perhaps some politicians will become the only beneficiaries of the planned transactions. "The susceptibility to corruption of some decisionmakers and the attempts to take political advantage of great arms contracts may destroy Poland's unique chance of providing relatively cheap new arms for its air forces, and developing its aircraft industry," says an anonymous representative of a foreign company. "The selection of an aircraft offer for Poland must be public," believes Andre Dacyl.

Poland: Military Research Institute Profiled
96EP0080A Warsaw WOJSKOWY PRZEGLAD
TECHNICZNY I LOGISTYCZNY in Polish
No 2, Mar-Apr 96 pp 6-7

[Article by Colonel Andrzej Grula, Ph.D., deputy commander of the Military Institute of Weapon Systems Technology: "Seventy Years of Weapon Systems Technology Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Archival materials prove that our predecessor, the Institute of Weapon Systems Technology (ITU), engaged in research into all domains of armaments. That research concerned chiefly rifle weapons, artillery equipment and ammunition, and even gunsights and predictors. The ITU's work was consonant with explicitly stated national priorities, namely, antitank and antiaircraft weaponry. Studies and analyses of these domains were carried out, along with blueprint and design work, quality testing of equipment, and expertises, in cooperation with institutions of higher education and other research centers, and even with industry. That cooperation was both institutional and personal because many of the institute's research associates were at the same time on the staff of, e.g., Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.

An explicit trend toward creating and developing a domestic experimental base arose at the ITU in Zielonka, where the Ballistic Research Center was established. It was there that the latest versions of armaments and equipment were tested. To this day the superbly designed and built tunnels there are still used for testing rifle weapons and ammunition.

Following World War II the domestic arms industry was rebuilt. In the mid-1950's it manufactured (on the basis of Soviet licenses) large quantities of rifle weapons and artillery armaments and ammunition.

Acceptance and quality-control tests of these products were entrusted to the research center organized in Zielonka. It was provided with Soviet equipment

and applied Soviet research and testing procedures. In time, however, there arose a tendency toward broadening the scope of its activities to cover more ambitious projects, and in 1964 the Military Institute of Weapon Systems Technology was established. Its statutory purposes included, among other things, conducting assessment studies and analyses, project design work, and acceptance testing and expertises, initially as regards so-called classical armaments, but later expanded to include the new domains of missiles and radar.

During the formative stage of the institute independent projects were attempted; for example, constructing a guided antitank projectile, but given the limited national sovereignty at the time these attempts could not be crowned with success because, instead of domestic solutions, designs under license were introduced.

This brief historical survey indicates that the role and place of the WITU (Military Institute of Weapon Systems Technology) were closely linked to what was happening in the domestic arms industry. The WITU was the research and design base of that industry.

Still, the initiation of ambitious projects, even though some of them remained on paper, promoted creating the potentialities for research. Teams of high-grade experts in various fields emerged and research facilities and stations were established. There also were specific domestic accomplishments, such as the P-64 pistol or the explosive lance for blowing up mine fields.

In the 1980's a tendency to arm the military with Polish-designed equipment on a broader scale became perceptible. It was especially noticeable in radar, which bore fruit in the establishment at the WITU of a flexible team focusing on research into radar equipment.

In other fields, too, the institute has scored specific accomplishments; for example, the following were designed there:

- Komar disposable antitank grenade launcher.
- Tachometric gunsight.
- Missile-artillery antiaircraft system.
- 120-mm projectile for mortar with extra missile propulsion.
- Spherical hand grenades.
- Mine-dropping shell.
- Timed electronic fuse for missile artillery.

In the late 1980's and early 1990's the situation changed markedly. On the one hand, owing to the shortage of the funds needed, staffing had to be cut in half, but on the other, in view of the newfound access to Western mate-

rials and technologies, the possibilities for undertaking ambitious projects became greatly enhanced. The needs of the military for modern armaments are huge, but the possibilities for satisfying them are conditioned by financial restrictions. Even so, in the last few years the following types of armaments have been developed and, for the most part, introduced:

- Warhead for a tactical missile.
- Reactive armor-plating of tanks.
- Plastic helmet.
- 60-mm mortar and the ammunition for it.
- 23-mm cartridge with a subcaliber projectile.
- Safety locks for antiaircraft missiles, making it possible to test-fire them on domestic proving grounds.
- Ballistic field radar station for measuring projectile velocities.

But, in accordance with the binding doctrine and needs of the armed forces of the Polish Republic, the institute is focusing its main effort on:

- Artillery and mortar ammunition, including antitank and homing (in the last stage of flight) ammunition.
- Fire-control systems.
- Radioelectronic warfare systems.
- New kinds of armor-plating for tanks.

Modern means of warfare require employing the latest achievements of science and technology; in particular:

- Far-infrared detection systems.
- Millimeter-wave detection systems.
- High-penetration hollow-charge warheads.
- High-energy kinetic subcaliber projectiles.
- Electronic digital systems for information processing.
- Information-processing algorithms and software.

At present, armaments and ammunition are inconceivable without modern electronics meeting extremely rigorous requirements as to operating conditions, e.g., in an artillery shell.

The institute does all its work in cooperation with the industry, making sure that models and prototypes be built using the latest technologies available to the Polish manufacturing plants (although, unfortunately, it is not possible to manufacture domestically certain components and materials). The institute's activities as

regards the use of ammunition and means of warfare are essential to the military.

Since the 1960's tests of the condition of ammunition and weaponry have been carried out with the object of assessing their safety. Owing to that work an ammunition-managing system has been introduced. The component elements of that system are record-keeping, checking the condition of ammunition, and predicting that condition. The institute is developing testing procedures, carrying out tests, and providing forecasts and recommendations to supply agencies.

The institute is able to carry out its mission efficiently owing to the availability of an adequate research and equipment base, which makes possible the tests of:

- Interior and exterior ballistics of rifle weapons and ammunition.
- Interior and exterior ballistics of artillery equipment and ammunition.
- Interior and exterior ballistics of antiaircraft and antitank missiles.
- Trajectory-end ballistics of missiles.
- Radar equipment and installations.
- Fire-control systems.
- Condition of ammunition and its elements.
- Physical and chemical properties of powders and explosives.

The institute operates up-to-date testing facilities unique in this country, particularly:

- Radar for measuring the velocity of a projectile all along its trajectory.
- Generators and analyzers for radar measurements.
- Devices for precision measurements of the caloric value of powders and explosives.
- Devices for quantitative chromatographic analysis of the composition of powders and explosives.
- A set of kinotheodolites for measuring the trajectories of flying objects.

The institute appreciates the importance of its research base and will continue to expand it. This is, in our

opinion, indispensable in the case of both domestic manufacture of armaments and their acquisition abroad. Equipment testing in laboratories serves to simulate the extreme conditions that may occur during normal operation.

Poland's intention to join the Western economic and military structures requires adapting our system to developing, testing, and introducing the standards binding in the West. This is a highly important task; first of all, a system for testing and certification meeting the Western norms has to be introduced. The institute is currently introducing these norms and applying for the accreditation of its ensemble of laboratories to the Polish Center for Testing and Certification and to other certification agencies.

Closely linked to the testing and certification system is the problem of standardization because certification is based on a system of standards for products destined for the military. So far only some of these products have been standardized; for a majority the requirements are contained in design blueprints, technical conditions, and research procedures. Thus we face the task of developing a huge number of norms that meet NATO requirements, and thereupon introducing these norms into blueprint, design, and research practices.

In a model comprising the network of ties linking the institutions engaging in the production and operation of armaments, the institute is the crossroads at which all the substantive linkages among research, producers, and users are centered. The paramount objective is to protect the interests of the Polish Army. We are trying to perform a function similar to that of a catalyst promoting the development of a domestic R&D and manufacturing base.

The WITU cooperates with the Military Technical Academy as well as with civilian technical universities and institutes, benefiting from their basic research. Their graduates are often hired by the institute.

In every domain of its substantive activities the WITU has developed specialized expertise useful to research, manufacturers, and the military. This is the result of operations of the institute as a school of applied knowledge of ballistics, and the construction and maintenance of armaments, ammunition, and means of warfare.

Romania: Melescanu Outlines Goals of U.S. Visit
AU1607081296 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1900 GMT 15 Jul 96

["Excerpt" of an "exclusive interview" with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by an unidentified reporter in Bucharest on 15 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Reporter] To begin, let's check the political climate in which his visit to the United States is taking place and see what level bilateral relations are at.

[Melescanu] There is an excellent climate for the visit, which is characteristic of the bilateral relations between Romania and the United States, something which was also demonstrated during President Ion Iliescu's recent visit to Washington. We are going to a friendly country with which Romania is striving to have privileged relations. From the viewpoint of the climate, we have no problems whatsoever. On the contrary, I would say we are starting from an excellent premise.

Naturally, the discussions will focus on all aspects of the relations between Romania and the United States; that is, the political, economic, cultural, and other fields of mutual interest. Let us remember that we have a very good basis for these relations. This time we will focus on a very specific point, meaning that we will pay particular attention to a subject that is a priority foreign policy objective for us and which is becoming an increasingly topical goal; namely, NATO's expansion and the decision of the Romanian Government and of Romania in general to integrate itself as fast as possible into this security structure, which is essential for our continent and, I would say, for the stability of the whole world.

Proceeding from this idea, I would like to emphasize two points: First, we will make a special effort this time to ensure that, aside from the contacts with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry, we will have as many contacts as possible with members of Congress—given the fact that there is great interest and concern in Congress with the problems of NATO expansion, as well as an ongoing debate on the ways and means to carry out the expansion. Therefore, we will have many meetings with Congress representatives and, for the first time ever, with aides of U.S. congressmen, who actually prepare the positions adopted by the U.S. congressmen. Likewise, we will make a special effort in the mass media and with experts dealing with international relations. In this respect, we have scheduled several news conferences and debates, and we hope this message—namely, the assets and importance presented

by Romania for the United States and for the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance—should be received as well as possible by the U.S. public.

[Reporter] Therefore, the main goal remains the plea for Romania's admittance into NATO in step with the rest of the South European countries. This time, the plea will rely on arguments regarding NATO's interest in the region.

[Melescanu] We will try to adjust our plea to the current conditions, so to speak. In my opinion, the developments in our region and at an all-European level make Romania's position more necessary than ever before, not only for the sake of Romania's stability and security, but also for the sake of utilizing the particular contribution which Romania can make to the stability of our region. We are going to emphasize these assets of our country in the context of the efforts being made to set up an all-encompassing security system at the European level for the next century.

[Reporter] The issue of granting permanent most favored nation [MFN] status for Romania will not be neglected, either, since the voice of anti-Romanian interests has already made itself heard.

[Melescanu] We hope that the House of Representatives will discuss this issue during our visit to Washington and that it will make a positive decision. In this respect, I would say that in my opinion there is a good and correct perception of the importance of MFN status both for Romania and the United States, but particularly for developing economic relations between our country and the United States. Of course, we have recently witnessed an intensification of the activity of certain troublesome elements. I find it difficult to comment on such things because I do not understand the purpose of their endeavors, and they look absurd to me. I do not believe anyone stands to benefit from a postponement of the MFN clause, not the majority of the Romanian population nor any individuals belonging to certain minorities. It is high time that we reached political maturity, both in our country and in certain circles of Hungarian emigration, and, I would say, in certain political circles in Budapest. We should realize that the development of close economic relations between Romania and the United States will benefit both countries. This has nothing to do with supporting a given government in Parliament. We should create a solid basis for developing bilateral relations, which can have a very positive impact on stability and security in the region and which directly benefits everyone concerned—both Romanians and Americans. Therefore, we very much hope that these disruptive elements, who are interfering in the debate in the U.S. Congress over the issue

of MFN status for Romania, will be treated as they deserve. Many influential congressmen, who, I would say, support the interests of the countries in this region—including congressmen of Hungarian origin, such as Mr. Tom Lantos—categorically support the granting of the clause to our country. Therefore, we are dealing here with a certain part of the Hungarian lobby and with an initiative of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] from our country. Nevertheless, I repeat, it is my hope that these initiatives—which I do not understand and which appear to me as running counter both to the European spirit and the spirit of the historic reconciliation we are trying to promote—will not be crowned by success. I would venture to say that we have a good chance, because Romania's situation is known and perceived in an increasingly objective manner.

Romania: PUNR's Funar Warns Iliescu of UDMR 'Separatism'

AU1207180396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In an open letter today to President Ion Iliescu, PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] leader Gheorghe Funar recalls that the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Council of Representatives will meet in Cluj Napoca on 13 and 14 July to discuss and endorse the draft statute of individual autonomy of the Hungarian communities in Romania, quote, in fact the statute for territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria in Transylvania, end quote.

Gheorghe Funar also claims that the decisions that will be made by the UDMR leadership are in conformity with the declaration issued in Budapest on the autonomy of Hungarians beyond the country's borders, aimed at the achievement of ethnic autonomy, which would automatically lead to separatism and to the creation of ethnically cleansed zones.

After enumerating a number of measures that the PUNR deems necessary in this context, the president of this political formation expresses the belief that, until all aspects of what he considers as Hungary's interference in Romania's internal affairs and all aspects of the UDMR's actions against the unitary Romanian national state are examined and clarified, the negotiations between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries on the issue of the basic treaty and reconciliation should be

suspended and he requests the president to take steps in this respect.

At the same time, Funar suggests that a dialogue should be held at Cotroceni Palace [Presidency] with the leaders of parliamentary parties on the issue of the actions of Hungary and the UDMR, supported by Hungarian irredentism, aimed against Romania and the Romanian nation.

In conclusion of his letter, Funar expresses his belief that all political parties will support the just position of the Romanian president regarding the refusal to include the Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201 in the draft treaty with Hungary.

Romania: Funar Confirms Readiness To Cooperate With PDSR

AU1307193596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 13 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference organized in Cluj, at the end of the proceedings of the National Council of the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), the party's president Mr. Gheorghe Funar said that this political grouping will continue to cooperate with the Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR) in government under certain conditions, which will be announced next week. Our correspondent Mihai Secelean recalls that Mr. Gheorghe Funar was designated today as PUNR candidate for the supreme position in the state. Mr. Funar said that the PUNR will contest the fall elections on separate lists, and that any possible political alliances will be concluded only after these elections.

Today's meeting also established the criteria for nominating the PUNR candidates for Romania's Parliament.

Given the fact that the meeting of the Council of Representatives of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] is also taking place in Cluj, Messrs. Gheorghe Funar, Valer Suian, Ioan Gavra, and Justice Minister Gavril Iosif Chiuzbaian made critical remarks about the personal autonomy discussed at the UDMR level. They qualified this concept as territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria and as an obstacle to European integration. The announced UDMR candidacy to Romania's presidency was considered, quote, an advantage for the PUNR.

Federal**FRY: EU Expected to Reintroduce Preference for FRY Products***LD1507183496 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1739 GMT 15 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 15 (TANJUG)—The European Union [EU] is expected to reintroduce the general preferential scheme for Yugoslav agricultural and most likely all industrial products as of Jan. 1 next year, Yugoslav government official Oskar Kovac told TANJUG Monday.

Kovac, who heads the government task force in charge of preparations for talks with international financial institutions, said a Yugoslav government delegation had been informed about the E.U.'s internal stands at a recent meeting in Brussels.

He said the expectations about the general preferential scheme were based on the stands presented in Brussels.

According to Kovac, the reintroduction of the general preferential scheme would be a step toward the normalization of relations between the E.U. and Yugoslavia.

Kovac said the move would practically mean that Yugoslav goods would be sold on the E.U. market without or with reduced customs tariffs, which would make Yugoslav products competitive.

He noted that talks on an agreement on Yugoslavia's associated membership in the union, similar to those offered to Slovenia and the Czech Republic, could be expected in the next stage.

FRY: Ministers, UNHCR Official Discuss Refugee Issues*LD1507193496 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1915 GMT 15 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Finance Minister Tomica Raicevic and the special envoy of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Soren Jessen-Petersen said Monday in Belgrade that the agreement signed recently by the Yugoslav government and UNHCR would contribute to an even more successful implementation of UNHCR humanitarian programs.

The meeting was attended also by the head of the UNHCR mission in Belgrade Margaret O'Keefe, the Yugoslav Information Secretariat said.

Minister Raicevic thanked UNHCR and its Belgrade office for their endeavors and underlined that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would continue fulfilling all its commitments stemming from the Dayton accord.

Jessen-Petersen also met Monday the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic. Their talk focused on resolving the problem of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, especially their return to their former homes.

The envoy also met Serbian Refugee Commissioner Bratislava Morina and they noted that the repatriation of considerable numbers of refugees would mainly depend on the success of the forthcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Morina urged UNHCR to step up its endeavors regarding the repatriation of Serbs to Krajina, from where about 250,000 Serbs fled last summer after Croatia's aggressions.

FRY: President Lilic Meets Sandzak Muslim Leaders*LD1507192796 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1907 GMT 15 Jul 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic conferred Monday with representatives of four Muslim political parties of Sandzak, a region extending across southwestern Serbia and northern Montenegro.

Lilic received Vice President of the Democratic Action Party (SDA) for Sandzak Dzemail Suljevic, SDA President for Montenegro Harun Hadzic, official of the Reformist Democratic Party of Sandzak Ramo Araslanovic and President of the Liberal-Bosnian Muslim Organization of Sandzak Kasim Zoranic at their request, the presidential office said.

The representatives of the four Muslim parties said they had asked for the meeting because they highly valued the Yugoslav leadership's efforts for lasting peace in all of the former Yugoslavia and its decisive calls for the full implementation of the Dayton Accords and Yugoslavia's full international reintegration.

They said they wished fully to contribute to the overall democratization processes and the creation of as favourable as possible conditions for understanding and dialogue among all political subjects in the country.

The officials of the four Muslim parties expressed full readiness for all problems to be resolved in keeping with the constitution, laws and systemic institutions.

Lilic said he was pleased that the basic democratic and constitutional principles were being taken as the starting point in the meeting.

He said that fact promised that there would be more meetings and all problems would be resolved through dialogue, political sobriety and even compromise.

Dialogue is possible on the basis of facts and the truth and not through the fanning of passions, with which we have had bitter enough experiences, Lilic said.

He noted that all citizens were equal under the constitution, in terms of nationality, religion and in all other ways.

Lilic said Yugoslavia was ready to enable the full exercise of human rights for every citizen through the further enhancement of the rule of law, democracy and economic development.

A great responsibility for the attainment of that goal, an equally important one as that of the state, rests with political parties which rally Muslims or any other citizens, Lilic said.

The opening of new crisis spots would lead nowhere, Lilic and the officials of four Muslim parties agreed.

We must all bear in mind not to let ultra-nationalists sow hatred, because it is lethal. Everyone who wants good for his compatriots must be guided by those principles, Lilic told the Muslim party officials.

The younger generations deserve it. We must turn to work, economic progress and better cultural life, we must leave behind the historically obsolete divisions and take part in the integration processes in Europe, where borders and all kinds of barriers are gradually coming down, Lilic said.

FRY: Commission Formed To Help Bosnian Refugees Vote

LD1507191796 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1830 GMT 15 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Government Monday set up a commission to provide help to refugees in the exercise of their right to vote in the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina scheduled for next September 14, Yugoslav Information Secretariat said.

The holding of free and democratic elections is one of the key segments of the peace agreement on Bosnia and should constitute a cornerstone for the further development of the entire region, the statement says.

As Yugoslavia is hosting a large number of refugees from Bosnia, its government intends to undertake organizational and other activities to enable the refugees in

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to exercise their right to vote.

The commission will cooperate with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] interim electoral commission for Bosnia.

The Yugoslav commission will be headed by Serbian Refugee Commissioner Bratislava Morina, and her assistant will be Montenegrin Refugee Commissioner Djordje Scepanovic.

Yugoslav Government has agreed to the opening of a liaison office of the OSCE Monitoring Committee for the participation of refugees in Bosnian elections, the statement says.

The government also decided to accept the invitation of the International Monitoring Commission for Bosnian Elections to send a Yugoslav monitoring team to the elections.

Serbia

Serbia: DSS Says Decision on Karadzic Contravenes Justice

AU1207200296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1330 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 12 Jul (BETA)—Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), has stated that the decision of the Hague Tribunal confirming the accusations against the political and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, is in line with the rules of this court but not in line with the principles of justice and international law.

"Contrary to its name, the Hague Tribunal is a political, quasi-legal body. There is no doubt that some legal justice exists in the tribunal, but political justice exists to the same degree it exists in the international community," Kostunica said.

The Hague tribunal is only an instrument in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, which is a matter of politics, that is, power, and not of justice, the DSS leader said. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Seselj Condemns Hague Decision on Karadzic, Mladic

AU1207194496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1405 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 July (BETA)—Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), stated today that the "terrorists and criminals representing the so-called international community have

started hunting down all those who do not accept vassal and servile attitudes toward the United States and its satellites."

In a statement issued today the SRS says that a SRS delegation is on a visit to the Bor region.

"Karadzic and Mladic are guilty only because they have been defending the Serb people. They are being tried and prosecuted by the international criminals and terrorists who bombed Serb towns, villages, and schools, killed Serb civilians, and caused babies to die only because they happened to be Serb babies," said Seselj in Brestovac.

"The Court of Justice has been turned into a court of self-indulgence over the insubordinate Serbs, so we should not be surprised if the self-appointed war crimes tribunal decided that the Serbs should kill themselves, and the territory of our people be given to the Muslims from Bangladesh who can no longer stand the hardships of monsoon rains," the SRS president concluded.

Serbia: Draskovic Says War Criminals Must Be Tried

AU1207202296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1405 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vienna, 12 Jul (BETA)—Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), stated today that no one, "including Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic," who has committed war crimes should escape the Hague tribunal.

Draskovic is today in Vienna, where he held talks with Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schuessel.

"Every crime is committed by individuals. We will not accept collective responsibility nor collective sanctions, but every individual in Serbia, including Milosevic, if they have indeed committed war crimes, should be brought to trial." [passage omitted]

Serbia: Opposition Urges Arilje Citizens To Vote for 'Victory'

AU1507203196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1901 GMT 14 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Arilje, 14 Jul—Vesna Pesic, Vuk Draskovic, and Zoran Djindjic, leaders of the "Together" [Zajedno] coalition, this evening called on Arilje citizens to vote for the united opposition because "only this can lead to changes in Serbia."

At the tenth electoral rally of the "Together" coalition, which gathered some 3,000 citizens from Arilje and surrounding villages, Democratic Party [DS] President Zoran Djindjic said that the main issues about which

Serbian citizens should question the current leadership are material, financial, and ideology issues.

"We need to ask the current leadership for whose benefit it is working," Djindjic said and assessed that they were ruling on behalf of a minority and for "fattening their bank accounts abroad."

"The agas and beys are on one side, the poor on the other," the DS president said.

"That is why we want a quarrel—not because we want to fight but because we can no longer watch Serbia sinking," Djindjic explained.

Djindjic said that he wants a "Serbia that will no longer accommodate people who have ruined it, a Serbia without corruption and monopolies." Vesna Pesic, leader of the Serbian Civic Alliance, said that this would be the year of the democratic opposition's victory and the year that will turn the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] into "the opposition, while the Yugoslav Left will disappear."

Pesic assessed that the SPS electoral campaign had begun, because Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "has again donned his old garb and has started to cut ribbons at various construction sites that will never be finished."

"No other single people has experienced as many defeats as the Serbs under Milosevic's rule," Pesic said.

Serbian Renewal Movement President Vuk Draskovic assessed that the current moment was "dramatic."

"We are experiencing the greatest national misfortunes, misery, and defeat," Draskovic said and added that Serbia could only be saved by the joint opposition with its program drafted by "wise people."

Draskovic said that the "Together" coalition's goal was to remove those people who had "defeated" Serbia.

He assessed the SPS program as "empty platitudes" and called on Serbian citizens not to believe in them.

"Do not allow Serbia to once again fall prey to empty platitudes, cast your ballot on behalf of victory," Draskovic said at the coalition rally "Together in Arilje."

Montenegro

Montenegro: Parliamentary Elections To Be Held Mid-Nov

AU1307194096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jul 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Elections in Mid-November"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The next parliamentary elections in Montenegro will be held in mid-November of this

year, most probably on Sunday 17 November, or perhaps a week later, MONTENA FAX reports. In the debate in the Montenegrin Assembly over these past days, several deputies of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists publicly stated that the elections would be held in November, and [Montenegrin President] Momir Bulatovic spoke of this, too.

Montenegro: Bulatovic on Communists' Role in Uprising

AU1307164896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 96

[Report by Jagos Stojanovic from Cetinje]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stojanovic] With the congratulations of [Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic, [FRY President] Zoran Lillc, [FRY Prime Minister] Radoje Kontic, [FRY Army General Staff Commander] Momcilo Perisic, and other most prominent personalities in our country, Montenegro is celebrating the anniversary of the general people's uprising, 13 July, when during the first year of World War II 32,000 of its soldiers attacked the enemy strongholds from Virpazar, Kosijeri, (?Cebe), and Misici all the way to Berane and other places, incapacitating some 6,000 enemy soldiers. In the nine days of the uprising the occupier managed to defend only the large barracks, while everything else was liberated. Rome sent five divisions as reinforcements to Montenegro after Montenegro's occupying commander (?Birolli) had sent out a message: Waging war here is the same as trying to plow the sea.

Early this morning wreaths and flowers were laid on the monument to the partisan fighter in Gorica, and at 1100 Cetinje, the old capital of the republic and a heroic town—49 of its soldiers also bear this title—hosted the central 13 July ceremony, entitled: The First Sparks Started Here.

After the national anthem and the greeting by Major Savo Parac and Ivo Kustudija, secretary of the Association of Fighters of the Liberating Wars, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic took the floor, emphasizing the traditional (?roots) of the 13 July uprising:

[Begin Bulatovic recording] We have celebrated 13 July for half a century. Our children learn about it among the first things, our old people often trade memories about it, while those in between are striving to integrate it into their everyday lives. The biggest state honor in Montenegro is the 13 July Award, which is bestowed for achievements and life work in the realm of creativity, science, and the arts. Only rare individuals and outstanding efforts can boast the title that the entire nation created at the crucial historic crossroads of time, on its constant path toward social

and national emancipation. However, any new [word indistinct] should not merely elicit pride and admiration for our heroes, as there is always place for new knowledge and new directions in the national and human existence.

The organization of the resistance in 13 July uprising in 1941 was based on the principles of the Montenegrin people's army from the times of King Nikola. Even the initial names of the divisions show how much this movement was rooted in the traditional values, including the epic legends. This was not a movement of any ideology. The rebels and their leadership included Communists, but also the officers of the earlier Yugoslav Army, intellectuals, students, workers, and farmers. Among them was also a great number of the sons of the most reputable and wealthiest men in Montenegro. Evidently, freedom was always such a treasure in Montenegro that the struggle for it erased all social, national, religious, class, and ideological differences. Looking back from the present stage of civilization, this in particular deserves to be noted and remembered.

Naturally, any war is also a political phenomena. Political and ideological differentiation occurred within a unified movement in time. The Communist Party of Montenegro, that is, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, was and remained the crucial political force that built itself into the 13 July uprising, and until the end persisted on the gigantic path of struggle against fascism. [applause]

Regardless of all the mistakes and subsequent blunders, the Communist Party of Montenegro and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia deserve eternal glory for advocating [applause] the work and contribution to the goals that benefited everybody in the war and postwar years in the middle of this century.

Faced with the constant dilemma of how to separate good from evil, how to chose the path ahead instead of a sidetrack, when to start something and when to finish it, these memories can and must be of assistance. Within the FRY, Montenegro's doors are wide open toward the future of the present and the coming generations. A period of peace in our direct vicinity is ahead of us, which, true enough, still requires careful and tender care, but this is peace on a lasting basis. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Returns From Talks With Germany's Kinkel

AU1507141696 Tirana ATA in English
1038 GMT 14 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 13 (ATA)—The President of the Republic of Kosova Ibrahim Rugova ended on Friday the official visit in Germany invited by the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

President Rugova said to journalists at the Rinas airport in Tirana that "the visit was important" while the talks "fruitful and useful."

He said that he discussed with Kinkel the Kosova issue, its solution through political means and based on the political will of the Kosova people. He added that Kinkel assured him that Germany together with other European Union member states and the United States will be engaged further in the solution of the Kosova issue. President Rugova said that he urged Germany to be present in Pristina through its representative office.

Kosovo: British Representatives Visit Province

LD1307142496 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1406 GMT 13 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, July 13 (TANJUG)—Serbia is prepared to start a dialogue with ethnic Albanians in the southern province of Kosovo and Metohija on all possible problems, except a possibility to alter the province's borders, representatives of provincial authorities told a British diplomatic delegation on Friday.

Director at the foreign office political department Jeremy Greenstock and British Ambassador in Belgrade Ivor Roberts told the representatives of provincial authorities in Pristina late on Friday that their government fully understood and supported the stand that the problem of Kosovo and Metohija was Serbia's internal affair.

A statement by the provincial information secretariat quoted Greenstock as saying that the British Government was very interested in normalizing the Kosovo issue.

Greenstock said that in all contacts with leader of the biggest party of Kosovo Albanians Ibrahim Rugova and other ethnic Albanian representatives, British officials unequivocally stressed that the independence of Kosovo or any new state in the region was out of the question.

Deputy head of the Kosovo district Milos Nesovic and provincial information secretary Bosko Drobnjak informed the British side that ethnic Albanians are visibly changing their attitude towards Serbia and its

organs and expressed hope that this would influence their political representatives.

Kosovo: Serb Party Leader Urges Serb-Ethnic Albanian Accord

LD1507195296 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1919 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 15 (TANJUG)—A Serbian party leader said on Monday [15 July] that Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Serbia's Kosovo-Metohija province must reach accord if they are to have a political, economic or any other kind of future in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

"The problem is that both Serbian and ethnic Albanian extremists and chauvinists are striving to subjugate the other side, propagating a new theory based on blood and evil," New Democracy Party Leader Dusan Mihajlovic told Radio Belgrade.

Mihajlovic, whose party is the socialists' coalition partner in the Serbian Government, said that the government was doing positive work in this connection.

He added that the reaching of a "political consensus in the functioning of the government has curbed hysteria, ensured the people's security and enabled the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to return to international economic and political institutions."

"Furthermore," he added, "it has reined in runaway inflation and restored the people's confidence in the functioning of the legal and equitable state."

Speaking about the activity of part of the opposition, Mihajlovic said that nothing good could come from force and false patriotism, and that problems must be dealt with by peaceful means alone, patiently, responsibly, wisely, through the democratic institutions.

Kosovo: Karadzic Called 'Most Popular Living Serb'

LD1507171296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1555 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina, 15 Jul (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, is "the most popular living Serb; every honorable Serb supports him," Kosta Bulatovic, one of the leaders of the Serbian Resistance Movement, told SRNA in Pristina today.

"I am hopeful that the Serb Republic will unite with Serbia and Montenegro; we can see Karadzic as the president of the joint country because we want to be led by those who have confirmed themselves in the struggle for freedom of their own people," Bulatovic said.

According to him, that is what gives rise to aggressive U.S. pressure and blackmail, which calls for Karadzic to be removed from the Serb political arena. "The Hague tribunal is not a court of justice but rather a court of political might. According to the Hague tribunal, the Serbs are to blame for everything and I would not be surprised if Clinton blamed the Serbs for a snowstorm in South Africa," Bulatovic went on to say.

He warned that the Serb Republic is threatened by the hypocritical and exhibitionist U.S. foreign policy which first affirms it is in favor of peace and then starts arming the Muslims. "The Serbs have to be cautious, they must not allow themselves to be taken in, since the equipping and training of the Muslims by the United States shows without a doubt that their intentions are aggressive."

According to him, "the difficult situation in the Serb Republic has also been caused by two years of blockade on the Drina; if the Belgrade regime had not made that shameful move, the Serb Republic would have been in a much better negotiating position before Dayton." [passage omitted]

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Democratic League of Croats Chairman Interviewed

AU1407182696 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jul 96 p 7

[Interview with Bela Tonkovic, chairman of the Democratic League of Croats in Vojvodina, by Gordana Rebic in Zagreb, date not given: "Immigrant Serbs are Driving Us Away"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The third convention of the Croatian World Congress was held last weekend on the Brijuni Islands, and Croats from all over the world gathered for the occasion. Bela Tonkovic, chairman of the Democratic League of Croats in Vojvodina, was also present. Before he left Zagreb for Brijuni, we spoke to Bela Tonkovic about the political and economic situation of the Croats in Vojvodina, as well as about their connections with the mother country and the role of international factors in resolving the issue of their status.

We Are Waiting for the Reply of the FRY

[Rebic] Mr. Tonkovic, what are the current problems of Croats in Vojvodina?

[Tonkovic] The problem of our status has not been solved. The FRY considers itself to be a civic state that does not need a law on minorities. In our opinion, the FRY must have that law; moreover, it must have a constitutional law on minorities that would define the

status, rights, and duties of all minorities. More than 37 percent of the population of the FRY are members of national minorities. We demand a constitutional law on the federal level that would recognize us as a national minority. We also demand cultural autonomy and self-government within it, which we would realize through a democratically elected Croat national council. We also want political subjectivity, i.e. the right to choose our own representatives in assemblies of all levels. Although our small number keeps us from crossing the threshold on the level of the Republic and the Federation, we want to have at least one representative in the assembly. We also want the institution of public legal officer for Croats, which would be our connection with the executive authorities, and the establishment of human rights tribunals on all levels.

[Rebic] How did the official political institutions of the FRY react on your demands?

[Tonkovic] The state refuses to discuss that now. However, on 29 April 1996 the Republic of Croatia suggested a draft agreement on mutual protection of minorities to the FRY Government. That law would regulate many problems on the intergovernmental level and define mechanisms for the realization of those solutions. The FRY is still considering the draft, and we are waiting for their reply. In our opinion, that step of the Croatian government was very good. We still do not have a single kindergarten, elementary, or high school, or scientific institution... When we inquire about the possibility of subvention given by the state, the state tells us that we, as an allegedly new minority, have no right to the status of national minority; and when we demand the status of a national minority, they reply it is unnecessary in a civic state.

The Ethnic Composition of Vojvodina

[Rebic] How much has the ethnic outline of Vojvodina changed in the last five years?

[Tonkovic] According to the statistics of the Catholic Church, there were 160,000 Croats in Vojvodina and 250,000 in the FRY in 1991. According to the data of the Community of Refugees and Displaced Croats from Vojvodina, approximately 45,000 went to Croatia as refugees. Consequently, there are about 115,000 Croats in Srijem, Banat, and Backa. Operations Storm and Flash also contributed to the changing of the ethnic composition of Vojvodina. The state statistics show that about 120,000 Serbs moved into Vojvodina after those two operations. According to the same source, 180,000 Serbs—9 percent of the total population of Vojvodina—have come since 1991. All those changes have increased the percentage of Serbs by 9 percent and

decreased the number of Croats by 25 percent. Besides, approximately 50,000 Hungarians have left Vojvodina. All that considered, the actual growth of the percentage of Serbs is 14, not 9 percent. Accordingly, Serbs make up 70 percent of total population of Vojvodina, compared to 57 percent in 1991.

[Rebic] What is behind those figures?

[Tonkovic] Since September 1990 we have been exposed to open terrorism. The state has tolerated it: Those who committed murders, planted bombs, and burned houses and estates of Croats have not been prosecuted. Even the Presidency of the former Yugoslavia decided at their time to dismiss Croats from the army and police, and many people "understood" that decree as applying to all other state institutions. Croats are systematically left out when judges are appointed, as well as in state administration, and there is only one Croat principal of an elementary school in the FRY. Besides, Croats are systematically dismissed from prominent positions in the economy. They are trying to put us in a ghetto. In mid-June we tried to discuss all those issues with Margit Savovic, federal minister for human rights and rights of national minorities, but she had no answer to our questions.

The Issue of Kosovo More Urgent?

[Rebic] To what extent is the international community aware of the situation in Vojvodina?

[Tonkovic] We have successfully internationalized our problems, but the international community finds the issue of Kosovo more urgent. At the moment, it is most important for them to persuade the Albanians of Kosovo to stay within the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo. They think that open hostilities are less likely to happen in Vojvodina. In my opinion, that attitude is very shallow and shortsighted. Certain academicians in the SANU [Serbian Academy of Science and Art] are already suggesting a peaceful separation of Kosovo. If that does not happen now, their ethnic border will not be on the border with Kosovo, but much farther into Serbia. Many persons in the international community are making projections of their own cabinet-made solutions on our region, instead of being ready to help us solve our problems from within. It has been a long time since we suggested the international factors to help the Serbs settle in regions of homogeneous ethnic composition. The reason is that they are claustrophobic and aggressive to non-Serbs in ethnically heterogeneous environment. However, the international community turned a deaf ear.

[Rebic] What is your opinion on the cooperation with the Croatian Government?

[Tonkovic] We cooperate within European standards, as a minority with a mother country. We are citizens of the FRY, and we are looking for solutions within that state, besides supporting the efforts of our mother state Croatia to solve our problems on the level of bilateral agreements. The attitude of Croatia toward us is within those European standards. That has worked very well and brought success so far. There have been no objections about us or the Republic of Croatia.

[Box, p 7]

Vojvodina Is Our Ethnic Territory

[Rebic] Considering the process of peaceful reintegration in Eastern Slavonia, what is the general disposition toward Croats?

[Tonkovic] The general attitude of Serbs toward Croats varies from the lack of trust of native Serbs, who have been influenced by the propaganda, to the open animosity of immigrant Serbs, who tell us openly that we have to move away. However, we consider Vojvodina to be our ethnic territory, too, and we are not ready to give up everything that we have built through centuries. We consider peaceful reintegration to be the best option for the solution of the crisis in eastern Croatia. The people who live there have in the past five years shown in the most brutal way that they do not want to live with Croats. They are aware that international or state guarantees cannot grant them forgiveness of their neighbors for everything they have done to them. That is why they are moving over to Srijem and Backa now, plundering the little that has not been plundered.

During the last two weeks they have shipped in trainloads of timbers, taken beams and tiles off houses, and taken away parts of infrastructure plants. They know that it is Croatia, that they cannot even dream of a district or anything. They know that Croatia has granted amnesty for all except for war criminals, and they do not dare stay and wait for the Croatian authorities. The present unemployment rate in Vojvodina is 24 percent, but it will grow to 33 percent when the remaining 9 percent of Serbs join in. Such a burden would be too heavy even for regions far wealthier than Vojvodina, and Vojvodina is bound to become a source of crisis.

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